Who Is Donald Rumsfeld?

[Gold9472]

Statements
Unnamed British Foreign Office source
“Since the legal basis (for the no-fly zones) is other than 1441, threats against our aircraft would not be a material breach of… [UN] resolution [1441].” — November 19, 2002 [Reuters, 11/19/2002]

Russian foreign ministry
“Recent claims that Iraq’s actions in the no-fly zones can be seen as a violation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1441 have no legal ground.” — November 19, 2002 [Reuters, 11/19/2002]

Unnamed UN Security Council source
“It’s one thing to keep up ‘zero tolerance’ to put the squeeze on Iraq. But in practice they know perfectly well that the other 14 council members were voting for disarmament, not the no-fly zone, or there would have been no vote.” — November 19, 2002 [Peoples Weekly World News, 11/23/2002; Reuters, 11/19/2002]

November 21-22,2002
A NATO summit is convened in Prague to welcome the Eastern European states of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, who will become members of the alliance in 2004. These seven countries, along with Albania, Croatia and Macedonia, release a statement [New York Times, 11/22/2002] , which says, “NATO allies stand united in their commitment to take effective action to assist and support the efforts of the UN to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq, without conditions or restrictions, with UN [Resolution] 1441.” [Daily Telegraph, 11/22/2002] The statement also says, “[W]e are prepared to contribute to an international coalition to enforce its provisions and the disarmament of Iraq.” [New York Times, 11/22/2002] Bruce Jackson, a former US Defense Department official who heads a Committee for the Liberation of Iraq, helps draft the statement. France also releases a statement, which is a bit less confrontational. [Agence France-Presse, 11/20/2002] A French official explains to the London Telegraph that the Eastern states’ statement was “his [Bush’s] own interpretation [of UN Resolution 1441] and we do not share it. On December 8, we will take note of what Iraq says it has… and we will see if its behavior is consistent with its statement.” Germany remains opposed to the use of military force. [Daily Telegraph, 11/22/2002] German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer tells reporters, “We are against military action. We don’t support military action. We want the possibility not to become the reality.” [New York Times, 11/22/2002] On the night of November 21, in an interview with Dan Rather of CBS news, Powell also makes the US position clear. He says, “If the [December 8] declaration is patently false and everybody can see it. If he does not let the inspectors do their job, then the president is fully ready to take the necessary step, which is military force.” [Evening News With Dan Rather, 11/21/2002] Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is also in town for the summit. Before he leaves Prague to meet with Slovak Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda in Slovakia, he says he will not believe Iraq if its declaration claims Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction. [Associated Press, 11/22/2002]

November 25, 2002
Eighteen international arms monitors, including 12 inspectors from the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and 8 from the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, arrive in Baghdad with their cargo of high-tech sensors, computers and other gear. [Independent, 11/24/2002; Associated Press, 11/25/2002; New York Times, 11/25/2002]

Make-up of Inspection Team - The complete roster of UN inspectors expected to participate in the inspections includes some 300 chemists, biologists, missile and ordnance experts and other specialists of UNMOVIC, as well as a few dozen engineers and physicists from the IAEA. Hans Blix of UNMOVIC will head the effort to search for chemical and biological weapons and Jacques Baute of the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency will lead the team seeking to determine if Iraq has reconstituted its nuclear weapons program. [Associated Press, 11/25/2002]
Purpose of Inspections - The stated purpose of the inspections, according to the UN resolution, is to bring “to full and verified completion the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions of the Council.” [United Nations, 11/9/2002] However, since the passing of the resolution the Bush administration has maintained that the purpose of inspections is much broader. For instance, US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld will claim in January that inspectors are not to act as “discoverers” trying to locate things. Rather the purpose of the inspections, according to Rumsfeld, is to determine whether Iraq is cooperating. [BBC, 1/22/2003]

Methods - The inspectors will “revisit the previously monitored sites to check if the equipment installed [by the previous weapons inspectors] is still functional,” explains a UN spokesperson. “It will take some time to do that work. We can’t rule out other activities, but it’s quite likely we will start with that.” Inspectors also says that they will not immediately conduct “intrusive” inspections into Iraq’s more sensitive areas. As an aide to Hans Blix explains to The Washington Post, “We’re not going to do in-your-face inspections. He [Blix] wants effective inspections. It’s not our job to provoke, harm or humiliate.” The inspections teams will also investigate new sites that the US and Britain allege are involved in the development of weapons of mass destruction. Inspectors will have the option to interview Iraqi scientists without the presence of Iraqi officials. The interviews may be conducted outside of Iraq. [Washington Post, 11/23/2002]

November 27, 2002
Department of Defense General Counsel William Haynes sends Donald Rumsfeld an action memo to approve for use, at General James T. Hill’s discretion, all techniques from Categories I and II, and the “mild, non-injurious contact” from category three that were suggested by the Guantanamo legal staff (see October 25, 2002). With regard to the remaining harsh techniques in category three, the death threats, and use of wet towels, Haynes writes that they “may be legally available [but] as a matter of policy, a blanket approval… is not warranted at this time.” Haynes mentions having discussed the matter with “the deputy, Doug Feith and General Myers,” who, he believes, join him in the recommendation. He adds, “Our Armed Forces are trained to a standard of interrogation that reflects a tradition of restraint.” [ [Sources: RAND Corporation]

End of 2002: Rumsfeld’s Secret Program Targeting ‘High Value’ Terrorists is Going Strong
The Special Access Program, or SAP, (see Late 2001-Early 2002) authorized by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld giving blanket advance approval to kill or capture and, if possible, interrogate high-value targets, has taken off and is apparently faring well. “It was an active program,” an intelligence source later explains to Seymour Hersh. “As this monster begins to take life, there’s joy in the world. The monster is doing well—real well.” Those who run the program, according to him, see themselves as “masters of the universe in terms of intelligence.” By the end of 2002, terrorist suspects are being interrogated in secret detention facilities in such places as Pakistan, Thailand, and Singapore. [Guardian, 9/13/2004]

December 2, 2002
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld approves General Counsel William J. Haynes’ recommendation (see November 27, 2002) and signs the action memo. [Associated Press, 6/23/2004] He adds in handwriting: “However, I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?” In signing the memo, Rumsfeld adds for use at Guantanamo Bay 16 more aggressive interrogation procedures to the 17 methods that have long been approved as part of standard US military practice. [New York Times, 8/25/2004] The additional methods, like interrogation sessions of up to 20 hours at a time and the enforced shaving of heads and beards, are otherwise prohibited under US military doctrine. [MSNBC, 6/23/2004]

December 3, 2002
Iraq reiterates its claim that it has no weapons of mass destruction in the country, foreshadowing the content of its formal declaration, which is due in five days. Responding to the statement, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says, “Any country on the face of the earth with an active intelligence program knows that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction.” And Bush says, “He [Saddam Hussein] says he won’t have weapons of mass destruction; he’s got them.” [BBC, 12/4/2002]

December 5, 2002
White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer says: “The president of the United States and the secretary of Defense would not assert as plainly and bluntly as they have that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction if it was not true, and if they did not have a solid basis for saying it.” When pressed for details, he adds: “President Bush has said Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. Tony Blair has said Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. Donald Rumsfeld has said Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. Richard Butler has said they do. The United Nations has said they do. The experts have said they do. Iraq says they don’t. You can choose who you want to believe.” [CBC News, 12/5/2002; Associated Press, 12/5/2003]

End Part XXI

 

[Gold9472]

December 11, 2002
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld sends President Bush a memo requesting authority to appoint US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) commander Adm. James O. Ellis Jr. in charge of all of the United States’ “strategic” warfare options to combat terrorist states and organizations. By giving STRATCOM warplanners jurisdiction over the full range of the country’s warfare options, the president would effectively remove a decades-old firewall between conventional and nuclear weapons which had served to prevent nuclear arms from being anything but a weapon of last resort. According to William Arkin, a columnist for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the request, if approved, would remove “nuclear weapons out of their long-established special category and [lump] them in with all the other military options.” Bush approves the request early the following month (see Early January 2003). [Los Angeles Times, 1/26/2003 Sources: Unnamed senior military officials at US Central Command, Memo obtained by the LA Times]

December 18, 2002: Rumsfeld Declares Taliban, Al-Qaeda ‘Gone’ from Afghanistan
When asked to comment on the current situation in Afghanistan, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld replies, “It is encouraging. They have elected a government through the Loya Jirga process. The Taliban are gone. The al-Qaeda are gone.” [CNN, 12/18/2002] In May 2003, Rumsfeld will prematurely declare that the conflict in Afghanistan is over (see May 1, 2003).

Late December 2002
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld signs a directive, ordering the deployment of an additional 50,000 reinforcements to the gulf region. The order includes some 4,000 soldiers from the Third Infantry Division, who are specialists in desert warfare. Orders to deploy or prepare for deployment are also given to several naval ships and Air Force squadrons. [New York Times, 1/1/2003; London Times, 1/2/2003] Military experts tell the Guardian of London that given the amount of resources that have so far been allocated in preparation for invading Iraq, it is very unlikely that war can be avoided. An unnamed source from the neoconservative Project for a New American Century tells the newspaper, “It’s very hard for a country to mobilize for war, and not to go for war without a very serious reason. If you signal to the world that you’re serious, and you don’t do anything, then you’re saying you’re not a serious country.” [Guardian, 12/31/2001 Sources: Unnamed source from the Project for a New American Century]

Early January 2003
US President George Bush approves Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s December request (see December 11, 2002) to give US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) warplanners jurisdiction over the full range of the country’s warfare options, including nuclear weapons. Many senior officials are concerned, according to columnist and reporter William Arkin, “that nuclear weapons—locked away in a Pandora’s box for more than half a century—are being taken out of that lockbox and put on the shelf with everything else.” [Los Angeles Times, 1/26/2003 Sources: Unnamed senior military officials at US Central Command]

January 7, 2003
At a press briefing, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld says, “There is no doubt in my mind but that they currently have chemical and biological weapons.” [Associated Press, 1/7/2003]

January 10, 2003
Defense Department officials and representatives from the Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos laboratories attend the “Stockpile Stewardship Conference Planning Meeting” called by Dale Klein, the assistant to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, to prepare for a secret conference on nuclear weapons during the week of August 4, 2003 (see Early August 2003). The purpose of the conference will be to discuss the construction of a new generation of nuclear weapons, including “low-yield” neutron bombs designed to destroy chemical or biological agents and “mini-nukes,” or “bunker-busters,” which could be used to destroy underground targets. Another purpose of the meeting will be to consider restarting nuclear testing and to discuss how the American public can be convinced that the new weapons are necessary. [San Francisco Chronicle, 2/15/2003; Guardian, 2/19/2003; Washington Post, 2/20/2003]

Commentaries
Stephen Schwartz
“To me it indicates there are plans proceeding and well under way… to resume the development, testing and production of new nuclear weapons. It’s very serious….How can we possibly go to the international community or to these countries and say ‘How dare you develop these weapons,’ when it’s exactly what we’re doing?” [Guardian, 2/19/2003]

January 12, 2003
Pentagon General Counsel William J. Haynes reportedly meets with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to discuss concerns over the use of interrogation techniques at Guantanamo that were approved by Rumsfeld in December (see December 2, 2002). Rumsfeld, according to Dell’Orto, calls Gen. James T. Hill and suspends the use of the category two and the single category three technique. [Washington File, 6/23/2004]

January 15, 2003
In a memo to General Counsel William J. Haynes, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, without an explanation, rescinds his authorization for the majority of the interrogation methods he approved in December (see December 2, 2002). The remaining methods can only be used with his express approval and on an individual basis. [New York Times, 8/25/2004] He also forms a panel of top Defense Department officials, known as the General Counsel Interrogation Working Group, “to assess the legal, policy, and operational issues relating to the interrogations of detainees held by the US Armed Forces in the war on terrorism.” This should ultimately result in the development of proper interrogation techniques. [MSNBC, 6/23/2004] The working group will consist of people working in the offices of William Haynes, Douglas Feith, the military departments, and the Joint Staff. Haynes will be the panel’s chairman. [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file]

January 19, 2003
Appearing on Fox News, Donald Rumsfeld, responding to a question, says, “… the Office of Management and Budget, has come up come up [sic] with a number that’s something under $50 billion for the cost. How much of that would be the US burden, and how much would be other countries, is an open question.” [US Department of Defense, 10/21/2002]

January 21, 2003
Corpwatch reporter Russell Mokhiber asks White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer to comment on a January 17 op-ed piece in the International Herald Tribune (see January 17, 2003) which criticized the Bush administration for its hypocritical condemnation of Iraq’s 1988 poison gas attacks on Halabja (see March 1988). [White House, 1/21/2003]

Mokhiber - “You and the president have repeatedly said that Saddam Hussein gassed his own people. The biggest such attack was in Halabja in March 1988, where some 6,800 Kurds were killed. Last week, in an article in the International Herald Tribune, Joost Hiltermann writes that while it was Iraq that carried out the attack, the United States at the time, fully aware that it was Iraq, accused Iran. This was apparently part of the US tilt toward Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war. The tilt included billions of dollars in loan guarantees. Sensing he had carte blanche, Saddam escalated his resort to gas warfare—graduating to ever more lethal agents. So, you and the president have said that Saddam has repeatedly gassed his own people. Why do you leave out the part that the United States in effect gave Saddam the green light?” [White House, 1/21/2003]

End Part XXII

 

[Gold9472]

Ari Fleischer - “Russell, I speak for President George W. Bush in the year 2003. If you have a question about statements that were purportedly made by the administration in 1988, you need to address those somewhere other than this White House. I can’t speak for that. I don’t know if it is accurate, inaccurate, but you have all the means to ask those questions yourself.” [White House, 1/21/2003]
Mokhiber - “The San Francisco Chronicle reported yesterday that a number of major American corporations—including Hewlett-Packard and Bechtel —helped Saddam Hussein beef up its military in the 1980s. And also the Washington Post, last month in a front-page article by Michael Dobbs said the United States during the ‘80s supplied Iraq with cluster bombs, intelligence and chemical and biological agents. In that same article, they reported that Donald Rumsfeld, now Secretary of Defense, went to Baghdad in December 1983 and met with Saddam Hussein, and this was at a time when Iraq was using chemical weapons almost on a daily basis in defiance of international conventions. So there are some specifics, and the question is—if Iraq is part of the axis of evil, why aren’t the United States and these American corporations part of the axis of evil for helping him out during his time of need?” [White House, 1/21/2003]

Ari Fleischer - “Russell, as I indicated, I think that you have to make a distinction between chemical and biological. And, clearly, in a previous era, following the fall of the Shah of Iran, when there was a focus on the risks that were underway in the region as a result of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Iran, different administrations, beginning with President Carter, reached different conclusions about the level of military cooperation vis-a-vis Iraq. Obviously, Saddam Hussein since that time has used whatever material he had for the purpose therefore of attacking Kuwait, attacking Saudi Arabia, attacking Israel. And, obviously, as circumstances warrant, we have an approach that requires now the world to focus on the threat that Saddam Hussein presents and that he presents this threat because of his desire to continue to acquire weapons and his willingness to use those weapons against others.” [White House, 1/21/2003]

Mokhiber - “If I could follow up on that—” [White House, 1/21/2003]

Ari Fleischer - “Russell. Russell.” [White House, 1/21/2003]

Mokhiber - “If I could follow-up on it. You and the president have repeatedly said one of the reasons Saddam is part of the axis of evil is because he’s gassed his own people. Well, he gassed his own people with our help. You saw the Washington Post, article, didn’t you, by Michael Dobbs?” [White House, 1/21/2003]
Ari Fleischer - “I think that statement is not borne out by the facts.” [White House, 1/21/2003]

Mokhiber - “Did you see the Post, article by Dobbs?” [White House, 1/21/2003]

Ari Fleischer - “I think that he gassed his own people as a result of his decisions to use his weapons to gas his own people.” [White House, 1/21/2003]

Mokhiber - “But who gave him the weapons?” [White House, 1/21/2003]

Ari Fleischer - “And I think the suggestion that you blame America for Iraq’s actions is way beyond the pale.” [White House, 1/21/2003]

Mokhiber - “Who gave him the weapons?” [White House, 1/21/2003] (Ari moves on.) [White House, 1/21/2003]

January 22, 2003
During a joint press conference, French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder announce that they intend to work together to oppose the Bush administration’s plan to invade Iraq. Schroeder says to a crowd of hundreds of French and German students in Berlin, “We are both of the opinion… that one can never accept it when it is said that war is unavoidable.” [BBC, 1/22/2003; BBC, 1/23/2003] Back in Washington, a reporter asks Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld if he thinks the actions of France and Germany would leave the United States without European support. To this Rumsfeld, responds: “Now, you’re thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don’t. I think that’s old Europe. If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the center of gravity is shifting to the east…. Germany has been a problem, and France has been a problem…. But you look at vast numbers of other countries in Europe. They’re not with France and Germany on this, they’re with the United States.” [US Department of Defense, 1/22/2003; BBC, 1/23/2003]

January 24, 2003
The US military command in Afghanistan, Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 180, issues a memo on interrogation techniques, which includes nudity on the list of effective interrogation methods, despite this tactic being presumably barred by Rumsfeld on January 15 (see January 15, 2003) for use at Guantanamo and in Afghanistan. According to Maj. Gen. George R. Fay, who will write a detailed report on detention operations (see August 25, 2004), the document “highlighted that deprivation of clothing had not historically been included in battlefield interrogations.” However he will add, “It went on to recommend clothing removal as an effective technique that could potentially raise objections as being degrading or inhumane, but for which no specific written legal prohibition existed.” [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] The document also speaks of exploiting the Arab fear of dogs. [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] Donald Rumsfeld also banned the use of dogs for interrogation purposes in his January 15 order (see January 15, 2003).

January 29, 2003
Donald Rumsfeld says at the beginning of a press conference that Saddam’s “regime has the design for a nuclear weapon; it was working on several different methods of enriching uranium, and recently was discovered seeking significant quantities of uranium from Africa.” [Washington Post, 8/8/2003]

January 30, 2003-January 31, 2003: Powell’s Top Aide Refuses to Include Material From White House Reports in Powell’s Upcoming UN Speech
Colin Powell’s chief of staff, Larry Wilkerson, meets with other administration officials and aides at the CIA’s Langley headquarters in a conference room down the hall from George Tenet’s office to review two White House reports on Iraq’s alleged illegal activities. The team includes George Tenet, John McLaughlin, William Tobey and Robert Joseph from the National Security Council, and John Hannah from Cheney’s office. The two dossiers are meant to serve as the basis for Powell’s upcoming speech at the UN (see 10:30 a.m. February 5, 2003). One of the reports—a 48-page dossier that had been provided to Powell’s office a few days earlier (see January 29, 2003) —deals with Iraq’s supposed arsenal of weapons of mass destruction while the other, a slightly more recent report totaling some 45 pages, addresses the issue of Iraq’s history of human rights violations and its alleged ties to Islamic militant groups. Shortly after Wilkerson begins reviewing the 48-page report on Iraq’s alleged WMD, it becomes apparent that the material is not well sourced. [Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pp. 230; Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 177] Wilkerson forces Hannah to show him the actual sources for each assertion made in the document. As Wilkerson will later recall, “It was clear the thing was put together by cherry-picking everything from the New York Times to the DIA.” Reporters Michael Isikoff and David Corn will write in their book, Hubris, that “a Defense Intelligence Agency report was not being used properly, a CIA report was not being cited in a fair way, a referenced New York Times article was quoting a DIA report out of context,” and that much of the material had come from the Iraqi National Congress and its chief, Alhmed Chalabi. [US News and World Report, 6/9/2003; Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 177] Powell’s staff is also “convinced that much of it had been funneled directly to Cheney by a tiny separate intelligence unit set up by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld,” Vanity Fair magazine later reports. [Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pp. 230] One item in the White House’s original draft alleged that Iraq had obtained software from an Australian company that would provide Iraqis with sensitive information about US topography. The argument was that Iraqis, using that knowledge, could one day attack the US with biological or chemical weapons deployed from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). But when Powell’s intelligence team investigated the issue, it became “clear that the information was not ironclad.” (see October 1, 2002) [US News and World Report, 6/9/2003 Sources: Unnamed senior source] “We were so appalled at what had arrived from the White House,” one official later says. [Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pp. 230] After about six hours, the decision is made to scrap the White House reports and start from scratch, using the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq that had been completed the previous October as the new starting point. [Bamford, 2004, pp. 368-9; Vanity Fair, 5/2004, pp. 230; Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 177-178] As one senior official (likely Wilkerson) will later recall, “We went through that for about six-hours—item by item, page by page and about halfway through the day I realized this is idiocy, we cannot possibly do this, because it was all bullsh_t—it was unsourced, a lot of it was just out of the newspapers, it was—and I look back in retrospect—it was a [Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas] Feith product, it was a Scooter Libby product, it was a Vice President’s office product. It was a product of collusion between that group. And it had no way of standing up, anywhere, I mean it was nuts.” [Bamford, 2004, pp. 368-9] (NOTE: It is possible that the 45-page report on terrorism mentioned above is the same as the “25-page report” mentioned in the February 1, 2003-February 4, 2003 event )

End Part XXIII

 

[Gold9472]

January 31, 2003: US Conducts Covert Surveillance Against United Nations Delegates
Frank Koza, chief of staff in the “Regional Targets” section of the National Security Agency, issues a secret memo to senior NSA officials that orders staff to conduct aggressive, covert surveillance against several United Nations Security Council members. This surveillance, which has the potential to wreak havoc on US relations with its fellow nations, is reportedly ordered by George W. Bush and his national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice. Koza, whose section spies on countries considered strategically important to US interests, is trying to compile information on certain Security Council members in order to help the United States to win an upcoming UN resolution vote on whether to support military action against Iraq (see February 24, 2003. The targeted members are the delegations from Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Mexico, Guinea, and Pakistan, who together make up the so-called “Middle Six.” These six nations are officially “on the fence,” and their votes are being aggressively courted by both the pro-war faction, led by the US and Great Britain, and the anti-war faction, led by France, Russia and China (see Mid-February 2003-March 2003. [Observer, 3/2/2003] Bulgaria is another nation targeted, and that operation will apparently be successful, because within days Bulgaria joined the US in supporting the Iraq war resolution. Oddly, Mexico, another fence-straddler, is not targeted, but tht may be because, in journalist Martin Bright’s words, “the Americans had other means of twisting the arms of the Mexicans.” (Bright is one of the authors of the original news report.) The surveillance program will backfire with at least one country, Chile, who has its own history of being victimized by US “dirty tricks” and CIA-led coups. Chile is almost certain to oppose the US resolution. [Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 3/6/2003] It is also likely, some experts believe, that China is an ultimate target of the spy operation, since the junior translater who will leak the Koza memo in February, Katharine Gun, is fluent in Mandarin Chinese and is unlikely to have seen the memo unless she would have been involved in translating it into that language. [AlterNet, 2/18/2004] Later assessment shows that many experts believe the spying operation scuttled any chance the US had of winning the UN vote, as well as the last-ditch attempt by the UN to find a compromise that would avert a US-British invasion of Iraq. [Observer, 2/15/2004] Chile’s ambassador to Great Britain, Mariano Fernandez, will say after learning of the NSA surveillance, “We cannot understand why the United States was spying on Chile. We were very surprised. Relations have been good with America since the time of George Bush, Sr.” [Observer, 3/9/2003] Mexico’s UN representative, Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, will tell the Observer a year later that he and other UN delegates believed at the time that they were being spied upon by the US during their meetings. “The surprising thing was the very rapid flow of information to the US quarters,” he will recall. “It was very obvious to the countries involved in the discussion on Iraq that we were being observed and that our communications were probably being tapped. The information was being gathered to benefit the United States.” [Observer, 2/15/2004]

• The memo comes just five days before Colin Powell’s extraordinary presentation to the UN to build a case for war against Iraq (see [complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_442]]), and is evidence of the US’s plans to do everything possible to influence the UN to vote to authorize war with that nation. The memo says the eavesdropping push “will probably peak” after Powell’s speech. [Baltimore Sun, 3/4/2003]
• The NSA wants information about how these countries’ delegations “will vote on any second resolution on Iraq, but also ‘policies’, ‘negotiating positions’, ‘alliances’ and ‘dependencies’—the whole gamut of information that could give US policymakers an edge in obtaining results favorable to US goals or to head off surprises.” [Observer, 3/2/2003] Bright will tell other reporters on March 9, “It’s quite clear what they were going for was not only the voting patterns and the voting plans and the negotiations with other interested parties such as the French or the Chinese, it wasn’t just the bare bones, it was also the office telephone communications and email communications and also what are described as ‘domestic coms’, which is the home telephones of people working within the UN. This can only mean that they were looking for personal information. That is, information which could be used against those delagates. It’s even clear from the memo that this was an aggressive operation. It wasn’t simply a neutral surveillance operation.” According to Bright’s sources, the orders for the program came “from a level at least as high as Condoleezza Rice, who is the President’s National Security Adviser.” [Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 3/6/2003] Koza advises his fellow NSA officials that the agency is “mounting a surge” aimed at gaining covert information that will help the US in its negotiations. This information will be used for the US’s so-called Quick Response Capability (QRC), “against” the six delegations. In the memo, Koza writes that the staff should also monitor “existing non-UN Security Council Member UN-related and domestic comms [office and home telephones] for anything useful related to Security Council deliberations,” suggesting that not only are the delegates to be monitored in their UN offices, but at their homes as well. Koza’s memo is copied to senior officials at an unnamed foreign intelligence agency (later revealed to be Great Britain). Koza addresses those officials: “We’d appreciate your support in getting the word to your analysts who might have similar more indirect access to valuable information from accesses in your product lines [intelligence sources].…I suspect that you’ll be hearing more along these lines in formal channels.” The surveillance is part of a comprehensive attempt by the US to influence other nations to vote to authorize a war against Iraq; these US attempts include proffers of economic and military aid, and threats that existing aid packages will be withdrawn. A European intelligence source says, The Americans are being very purposeful about this.” [National Security Agency, 1/31/2003; Observer, 3/2/2003; Observer, 2/8/2004]
• Interestingly, while the European and other regional media have produced intensive coverage of the news of the NSA’s wiretapping of the UN, the American media virtually ignores the story until 2004, when Gun’s court case is scheduled to commence (see February 26, 2004). Bright, in an interview with an Australian news outlet, says on March 6 that “t’s as well not to get too paranoid about these things and too conspiratorial,” he was scheduled for interviews by three major US television news outlets, NBC, Fox News, and CNN, who all “appeared very excited about the story to the extent of sending cars to my house to get me into the studio, and at the last minute, were told by their American desks to drop the story. I think they’ve got some questions to answer too.” [Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 3/6/2003] Most US print media outlets fail to cover the story, either. The New York Times, the self-described newspaper of record for the US, do not cover the story whatsoever. The Times’s deputy foreign editor, Alison Smale, says on March 5, “Well, it’s not that we haven’t been interested, [but] we could get no confirmation or comment” on the memo from US officials. “We would normally expect to do our own intelligence reporting.” The Washington Post publishes a single story about the operation, focusing on the idea that surveillance at the UN is business as usual. The Los Angeles Times fixes on claims by unnamed “former top intelligence officials” believe Koza’s memo is a forgery. (When the memo is proven to be authentic, both the Post and the Los Angeles Times refuse to print anything further on the story.) Author Norman Solomon writes, “In contrast to the courage of the lone woman who leaked the NSA memo—and in contrast to the journalistic vigor of the Observer team that exposed it—the most powerful US news outlets gave the revelation the media equivalent of a yawn. Top officials of the Bush administration, no doubt relieved at the lack of US media concern about the NSA’s illicit spying, must have been very encouraged.” [ZNet, 12/28/2005]
  [*]The United Nations will launch its own inquiry into the NSA surveillance operation (see March 9, 2003).
  

February 5, 2003
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Richard Myers, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, inform the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee that they intend to seek permission from George Bush to use calmative agents (see February 12, 2001-March 30, 2001) against Iraqi civilians, in cave systems or to take prisoners. [NewsMax, 2/6/2003; Independent, 2/16/2003] Rumsfeld calls the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) a “straightjacket” [Baltimore Sun, 3/27/2003; Guardian, 4/8/2003] and insists that “there are times when the use of non-lethal riot agents is perfectly appropriate.” [NewsMax, 2/6/2003; Christian Science Monitor, 2/14/2003; Guardian, 3/12/2003; Guardian, 4/8/2003] Under the provisions of the CWC, military use of chemicals—including non-lethal gases like tear gas—is prohibited. The treaty only permits the use of non-lethal agents for law enforcement purposes. [NewsMax, 2/6/2003; Christian Science Monitor, 2/14/2003]

February 11, 2003
In Munich, in reference to the imminent war on Iraq, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is asked whether the US is bound by any international system, legal framework or code of conduct. Avoiding a direct answer, Rumsfeld replies: “I honestly believe that every country ought to do what it wants to do…. It either is proud of itself afterwards, or it is less proud of itself.” [Guardian, 2/11/2004]

February 14, 2003-June 4, 2004: Rumsfeld Recounts Sultan Calling 9/11 a ‘Blessing in Disguise’
In numerous public appearances, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld recounts a conversation with the Sultan of Oman (Qaboos Bin Said) a month or two after 9/11. The sultan said to him words to the effect of that September 11 was a “blessing in disguise,” because it would “wake up the world, before terrorists get their hands on massive destruction, before they get biological weapons and kill not 3,000 but 30 or 300,000.” [Rumsfeld, 2/14/2003; US Department of Defense, 2/25/2003; US Department of Defense, 9/10/2003; US Department of Defense, 11/18/2003; US Department of Defense, 6/4/2004] When he is asked in an interview, “Do you feel that [9/11] was a wake- up call?” Rumsfeld responds, “I think so absolutely, yeah.” [PBS, 9/10/2003] Rumsfeld makes a similar claim in his prepared testimony for the 9/11 Commission in March 2004: “Think about what has been done since the September 11th attacks: two state sponsors of terrorism have been removed from power, a 90-nation coalition has been formed which is cooperating on a number of levels… All of these actions are putting pressure on terrorist networks. Taken together, they represent a collective effort that is unprecedented—which has undoubtedly saved lives, and made us safer than before September 11th.” [9/11 Commission, 3/23/2004]

February 27, 2003: Iraq Destroys its Al Samoud Missiles; US Describes Iraq’s Actions as ‘Deception’
Iraq agrees to destroy all the equipment associated with its Al Samoud missile program, including warheads, SA-2 missile engines, machinery to produce missile motors, fuel, launchers, testing equipment, components as well as all software and documentation. The UN had earlier concluded that the missile program was in violation of UN resolutions because the range of the missiles exceeds the 150km limit imposed in 1991 after the Gulf War (see February 12, 2003). Responding to news of Iraq’s decision, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer dismisses any suggestion that it is an example of Iraqi cooperation. Instead he describes it as “deception.” He says, “This is the deception the president predicted. We do expect that they will destroy at least some of their missiles.” He also says that Iraq’s actions constitute “propaganda, wrapped in a lie, inside a falsehood.” And Donald Rumsfeld offers a similar interpretation of Iraq’s actions. He says: “I don’t see a change in the pattern at all. You know, this is exactly what’s been going to for years…. They refuse to cooperate, don’t cooperate, drag it out, wait until someone finally nails them with one little piece of the whole puzzle and refuse to do anything about it and then finally when they see the pressure building, they say well, maybe we’ll do some of that.” Bush similarly states: “The discussion about these rockets is part of [Saddam’s] campaign of deception. See, he’ll say, ‘I’m not going to destroy the rockets,’ and then he’ll have a change of mind this weekend and destroy the rockets and say, ‘I’ve disarmed.’” And Powell says: “I think it’s just more indication of the reality that we have been trying to convey to the world, that Saddam Hussein is trying to string it out, trying to divert attention, trying to pretend he is cooperating when he is not cooperating, try[ing] to use process as an excuse for not cooperating and not complying with the will of the international community.” [BBC, 1/28/2003; Associated Press, 2/28/2003; Fox News, 2/28/2003; New York Times, 3/1/2003]

End Part XXIV

 

[Gold9472]

March 6, 2003
A working group appointed by the Defense Department’s general counsel, William J. Haynes II, completes a 100-page-plus classified report justifying the use of torture on national security grounds. The group—headed by Air Force General Counsel Mary Walker and including top civilian and uniformed lawyers from each military branch—consulted representatives of the Justice Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and other intelligence agencies in drafting the report. It was prepared for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and was meant to respond to complaints from commanders working at the Guantanamo Bay base in Cuba who claimed that conventional interrogation tactics were inadequate. The conclusions in the report are similar to those of an August 1, 2003 memo (see August 1, 2002) drafted by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OFC). The OFC is said to have also contributed to this report. [US Department of Defense, 3/6/2003; Wall Street Journal, 6/7/2004; Los Angeles Times, 6/10/2004]

Conclusions of the report -

• One of the main conclusions of the report is that the president’s authority as commander-in-chief permits him during times of war to approve almost any physical or psychological interrogation method—including torture—irrespective of any domestic or international law. The draft report clearly states that neither Congress, the courts, nor international law has jurisdiction over the president’s actions when the country is waging war. The report asserts that “without a clear statement otherwise, criminal statutes are not read as infringing on the president’s ultimate authority” to wage war. Furthermore, “any effort by Congress to regulate the interrogation of unlawful combatants would violate the Constitution’s sole vesting of the commander-in-chief authority in the president.” According to the document, the federal Torture Statute simply does not apply. “In order to respect the president’s inherent constitutional authority to manage a military campaign… (the prohibition against torture) must be construed as inapplicable to interrogations undertaken pursuant to his commander-in chief authority,” the report states (The parenthetical comment is in the original document). A career military lawyer will later tell the Wall Street Journal that many lawyers disagreed with these conclusions, but that their concerns were overridden by the political appointees heading the drafting of the report. The lawyer explains that instead, military lawyers focused their efforts on limiting the report’s list of acceptable interrogation methods. [Wall Street Journal, 6/7/2004]
• The draft report lists several possible arguments that US civilian or military personnel might use to defend themselves against charges of torture or other war crimes. According to the administration’s lawyers, one argument would be that such actions were “necessary” in order to prevent an attack. This rational however seems to ignore very clear statements in the Convention Against Torture—ratified by the US in 1994—which states that “no exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.” Another line of defense, the report says, would be to claim that the accused had been acting under “superior orders” and that therefore no “moral choice was in fact possible.” Likewise, the report cites a Justice Department opinion, which the draft report says “concluded that it could not bring a criminal prosecution against a defendant who had acted pursuant to an exercise of the president’s constitutional power.” However, as the Wall Street Journal notes, this contradicts the Convention against Torture which states that orders from superiors “may not be invoked as a justification of torture.” The authors of the report also suggest in the draft report that accused officials could argue that they had “mistakenly relied in good faith on the advice of lawyers or experts,” adding, “Good faith may be a complete defense.” The memo also argues that the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights (ICCPR), to which the US is a party, “does not apply outside the United States or its special maritime and territorial jurisdiction (SMTJ), and that it does not apply to operations of the military during an international armed conflict,” as the US “has maintained consistently.” Since the “Guantanamo Bay Naval Station (GTMO) is included within the definition of the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” the ICCPR does not apply to Guantanamo Bay. The authors are also convinced that officials would not be prosecutable under US law, concluding that “constitutional principles” precluded the possibility that officials could be punished “for aiding the president in exercising his exclusive constitutional authorities” and neither Congress nor the courts had the authority to “require or implement the prosecution of such an individual.” [Wall Street Journal, 6/7/2004]
• The document attempts to define the parameters of lawful interrogation methods in terms of the degree of pain or psychological manipulation they cause. The report states that the infliction of physical or mental suffering does not constitute torture. To violate Section 2340 A of the US Code, prohibiting physical torture, suffering must be “severe,” the lawyers advise, noting that according to a dictionary definition, this would mean that the pain “must be of such a high level of intensity that… [it] is difficult for the subject to endure.” It must also be “inflicted with specific intent,” they say, meaning that the perpetrator expressly intends to cause severe pain and suffering. But if the defendant simply used pain and suffering as a means to an end, such specific intent would not exist. Under certain circumstances, the lawyers explain, the US would be justified in resorting to illegal measures like torture or homicide. They argue that such measures should be considered “self-defense” in cases where officials “honestly believe” that such actions would prevent an imminent attack against the US. “Sometimes the greater good for society will be accomplished by violating the literal language of the criminal law,” the draft document asserts. “In sum,” the panel determines, “the defense of superior orders will generally be available for US Armed Forces personnel engaged in exceptional interrogations except where the conduct goes so far as to be patently unlawful.” Civil law suits, the panel notes, by a foreign victim of torture will not apply to the US government. [US Department of Defense, 3/6/2003; Wall Street Journal, 6/7/2004]

Commentaries
Kenneth Roth
“If anyone still thinks the abuses at Abu Ghraib were only dreamed up by a handful of privates and sergeants, this memo should put that myth to rest.” — June 7, 2004 [Human Rights Watch, 6/7/2004]

“Senior administration officials tried to drape a thin veneer of legality over abuse that has been unconditionally prohibited, even during war, throughout modern times. If this legal advice were accepted, dictators worldwide would be handed a ready-made excuse to ignore one of the most basic prohibitions of international human rights law.” — June 7, 2004 [Human Rights Watch, 6/7/2004]

(March 19, 2003-July 16, 2003): Donald Rumsfeld Approves All Requests for Air Strikes With High Risk of Killing More Than 30 Civilians
US air war planners, who are required to get pre-approval for air strikes they believe may kill more than 30 civilians, send more than 50 such requests to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld approves all of the strikes. [New York Times, 7/20/2003]

March 24, 2003
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld says on CBS’s “Face the Nation” : “We have seen intelligence over many months that they have chemical and biological weapons, and that they have dispersed them and that they’re weaponized and that, in one case at least, the command and control arrangements have been established.” [Village Voice, 6/18/2003]

March 27, 2003
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says during a Senate hearing, “When it comes to reconstruction, before we turn to the American taxpayer, we will turn first to the resources of the Iraqi government and the international community.” [Financial Times, 1/16/2004]

March 30, 2003
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld tells George Stephanopolous of ABC News: “We know where they [the chemical and biological weapons] are. They’re in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad and east, west, south and north somewhat.” [ABC, 4/30/2003; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 7/17/2003]

(April 2003)
An unnamed intelligence source tells reporter Thomas Ricks of the Washington Post, “Rumsfeld is in a death fight with DCI (Director of Central Intelligence) to get control” of intelligence assets. [Washington Post, 4/20/2003]

April 11, 2003: Rumsfeld Says of Looting: ‘Freedom’s Untidy’
Donald Rumsfeld says of the looting in Iraq: “Freedom’s untidy, and free people are free to make mistakes and commit crimes and do bad things. They’re also free to live their lives and do wonderful things, and that’s what’s going to happen here.” [US Department of Defense, 4/11/2003]

April 13, 2003
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says on NBC’s “Meet the Press”: “The task is to create an environment that is sufficiently permissive that the Iraqi people can fashion a new government. And what they will do is come together in one way or another and select an interim authority of some kind. Then that group will propose a constitution and a more permanent authority of some kind. And over some period of months, the Iraqis will have their government selected by Iraqi people.” [MSNBC, 4/13/2003]

End Part XXV

 

[Gold9472]

April 16, 2003
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld signs a memo on interrogation methods approving 24 of the 35 techniques recommended by the Pentagon working group (see April 4, 2003) earlier in the month. The new set of guidelines, to be applied to prisoners at Guantanamo and Afghanistan, is a considerably softer version of the initial interrogation policy that Rumsfeld approved in December 2002 (see December 2, 2002). [Roth and Malinowski, 5/3/2004; Washington Post, 5/11/2004; Age (Melbourne), 5/13/2004; Washington Post, 5/13/2004; Los Angeles Times, 5/22/2004; Newsweek, 5/24/2004; Wall Street Journal, 6/7/2004; MSNBC, 6/23/2004; Truthout (.org), 6/28/2004] Several of the techniques listed are ones that the US military trains Special Forces to prepare for in the event that they are captured by enemy forces. [New York Times, 5/13/2004 Sources: Unnamed US intelligence officials and other US officials] The list is divided into two classes: tactics that are authorized for use on all prisoners and special “enhanced measures” that require the approval of Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez. The latter category of methods includes tactics that “could cause temporary physical or mental pain,” like “sensory deprivation,” “stress positions,” “dietary manipulation,” forced changes in sleep patterns, and isolated confinement. [Washington Post, 5/11/2004; Washington Post, 5/13/2004 Sources: Unnamed US intelligence officials and other US officials] Other techniques include “change of scenery down,” “dietary manipulation,” “environmental manipulation,” and “false flag.” The first 18 tactics listed all appear in the 1992 Field Manual (FM) 34-52, with the exception of the so-called “Mutt-and-Jeff” approach, which is taken from an obsolete 1987 military Field Manual (1987 FM 34-52). [USA Today, 6/22/2004] The use of forced nudity as a tactic is not included in the list. The working group rejected it because its members felt it might be considered inhumane treatment under international law. [Associated Press, 6/23/2004] The memo, marked for declassification in 2013, [Truthout (.org), 6/28/2004] is the outcome, according to Deputy General Counsel Dell’Oro, of discussions between Rumsfeld, William Haynes, Douglas Feith, Paul Wolfowitz and Gen. Richard Myers. [Washington File, 6/23/2004] One US official explains, “There are very specific guidelines that are thoroughly vetted. Everyone is on board. It’s legal.” However in May 2004, it will be learned that there was in fact opposition to the new guidelines. Pentagon lawyers from the Army Judge Advocate General’s office had objected (see May 2003) (see October 2003) and many officials quietly expressed concerns that they might have to answer for the policy at a later date (see (April 2003)). [Washington Post, 5/11/2004; Washington Post, 5/13/2004 Sources: Unnamed US intelligence officials and other US officials]

Commentaries
Kenneth Roth
“None of these techniques is legal. Treaties ratified by the United States, including the Geneva Conventions and the UN Convention Against Torture, prohibit not only torture but also ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’” — May 13, 2004 [Washington Post, 5/13/2004]

“In other words, just as US courts repeatedly have found it unconstitutional for interrogators in American police stations to use these third-degree methods, it is illegal under international law for US interrogators in Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay or elsewhere to employ them. US military manuals ban these ‘stress and duress’ techniques, and federal law condemns them as war crimes.” — May 13, 2004 [Washington Post, 5/13/2004]

“The Abu Ghraib outrages are not simply the product of a small group of sick and misguided soldiers. They are the predictable result of the Bush administration’s policy of permitting ‘stress and duress’ interrogation techniques. The sexual abuse of prisoners, despicable as it is, is a logical consequence of a system put in place after Sept. 11, 2001, to ratchet up the pain, discomfort and humiliation of prisoners under interrogation.” — May 13, 2004 [Washington Post, 5/13/2004]

Amnesty International
“Coercive interrogation methods endorsed by members of the US government amount to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and violate international law and the USA’s treaty obligations” — May 13, 2004 [Amnesty International, 5/13/2004]

April 24, 2003
US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld tells the Associated Press, “If you’re suggesting, how would we feel about an Iranian-type government with a few clerics running everything in the country, the answer is: That isn’t going to happen.” [Associated Press, 4/25/2003; Guardian, 4/25/2003]

May 1, 2003: Rumsfeld Prematurely Declares an End to War in Afghanistan
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld announces that the 8,000 US soldiers in Afghanistan have ended major combat operations there and will now shift their focus to rebuilding the country. The US talks about reducing the number of troops in 2004 and replacing them with newly trained Afghan soldiers. Rumsfeld’s announcement comes on the same day that President Bush declares that combat operations have ended in Iraq (see May 1, 2003). Rumsfeld says that small-scale combat operations will continue to mop up pockets of Taliban and al-Qaeda resistance. [Washington Post, 5/2/2003] Over two years later, in June 2005, the New York Times will report that despite periodic predictions of the Taliban’s collapse, recent intense fighting “reveals the Taliban to be still a vibrant fighting force supplied with money, men and weapons.” While the Taliban may not be able to hold ground in the “almost forgotten war,” they have enough personnel and weapons to “continue their insurgency indefinitely” and render parts of the country ungovernable. [New York Times, 6/4/2005]

Mid-May 2003: US Rejects Al-Qaeda-MEK Prisoner Exchange with Iran
Around May 4, 2003, Iran attempted to start negotiations in an attempt to resolve all outstanding issues between Iran and the US. The US completely rejected the offer within days. Iran immediately comes back with a more limited proposal, offering to hand over a group of al-Qaeda leaders being held in Iran in return for the US to hand over leaders of the Mujahedeen of Iran (MEK). The US had already officially listed MEK as a terrorist group. [American Prospect, 5/21/2006] Iran is believed to be holding a number of top al-Qaeda leaders, including military commander Saif al-Adel and Osama bin Laden’s son Saad bin Laden (see Spring 2002). The US had captured about 4,000 members of MEK in Iraq the month before, in bases where they had been staging attacks against Iran. Iran pledges to grant amnesty to most of the MEK prisoners, try only 65 leaders, forgo the death penalty on them, and allow the Red Cross to supervise the transfer. [Washington Post, 7/9/2004] Iran proposes to start with an exchange of information, offering to share the list of names of al-Qaeda operatives they are detaining in return for the US to share the list of names of MEK operatives US forces has captured in Iraq. This exchange of names is discussed at a White House meeting. Hardliners in favor of regime change in Iran argue that MEK is different than al-Qaeda. President Bush is said to respond, “But we say there is no such thing as a good terrorist.” [American Prospect, 5/21/2006] And he initially seems in favor of a prisoner exchange, saying about the MEK, “Why not? They’re terrorists.” [Washington Post, 7/9/2004] But Bush does not immediately approve the exchange of names, although he does approve the disarming of MEK who have surrendered to US troops and he allows the State Department to continue secret negotiations on the issue of exchanging names and prisoners in Switzerland. But on May 12, 2003, a bombing in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia kills a number of US citizens (see May 12, 2003). Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, Vice President Cheney, and other neoconservatives argue that the bombing was planned by al-Qaeda leaders being held in Iran. [American Prospect, 5/21/2006] The Washington Post will report in 2007 that, “US intelligence officials said there are suspicions, but no proof, that one of [the al-Qaeda leaders in Iran] may have been involved from afar in planning” the Riyadh bombing. Some of Bush’s top advisers argue in favor of trading the prisoners, suggesting that directly interrogating the al-Qaeda leaders could result in important new intelligence leads. But Cheney and Rumsfeld argue that any deal would legitimize Iran’s government. Bush ultimately offers to accept information about the al-Qaeda leaders without offering anything in return. Not surprisingly, Iran refuses. [Washington Post, 2/10/2007] A planned meeting between US and Iranian officials on May 21 is canceled and negotiations come to a halt. The American Prospect will later comment, “In a masterstroke, Rumsfeld and Cheney had shut down the only diplomatic avenue available for communicating with Iran and convinced Bush that Iran was on the same side as al-Qaeda.” [American Prospect, 5/21/2006] Flynt Leverett, a State Department official dealing with Middle East policy, will later say, “Why we didn’t cut this deal is beyond me.” [Washington Post, 7/9/2004] One anonymous senior US official will later say, “One reason nothing came of it was because we knew that there were parts of the US government who didn’t want to give them the MEK because they had other plans for them… like overthrowing the Iranian government.” [MSNBC, 6/24/205]

End Part XXVI

 

[Gold9472]

May 27, 2003
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld tells the Council on Foreign Relations in New York: “While our goal is to put functional and political authority in the hands of Iraqis as soon as possible, the Coalition Provisional Authority has the responsibility to fill the vacuum of power . . . by asserting temporary authority over the country. The coalition will do so. It will not tolerate self-appointed ‘leaders.’” [Council for Foreign Relations, 5/27/2003]

May 29, 2003
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says in a “Town Hall meeting” with Infinity Radio: “[When asked: When do you think there might be a government in place, even a provisional government in place in Iraq? Rumsfeld reponds:] I don’t know.” [Infinity Radio, 5/29/2003]

After June 2003
Several Bush administration officials back off earlier claims of an alliance between Saddam Hussein’s regime and al-Qaeda. [Laura Ingraham Show, 8/1/2003; Associated Press, 9/16/2003; Associated Press, 1/8/2004; Independent, 1/11/2004]

Statements
Donald Rumsfeld
“I’ve not seen any indication that would lead me to believe that” Iraq had a hand in the September 11 attacks. — September 16, 2003 [Associated Press, 9/16/2003]

Colin Powell
“I have not seen smoking gun, concrete evidence about the connection, but I think the possibility of such connections did exist and it was prudent to consider them at the time that we did.” — After June 2003 [Associated Press, 1/8/2004; Independent, 1/11/2004]

Paul Wolfowitz
“I’m not sure even now that I would say Iraq had something to do with it [9/11]. I think what the realization to me is—the fundamental point was that terrorism had reached the scale completely different from what we had thought of it up until then. And that it would only get worse when these people got access to weapons of mass destruction which would be only a matter of time.” — August 1, 2003 [Laura Ingraham Show, 8/1/2003]

June 18, 2003: Garner Meets with Rumsfeld
Retired Army lieutenant general Jay Garner meets with Donald Rumsfeld to report on his experiences as former head of the American-run Iraqi civilian administration. He tells Rumsfeld that his successor, Paul Bremer, made “three terrible mistakes.” He cites the purge of Baathists from Iraq’s public sector, the disbanding of the Iraqi military, and the dismissal of an interim Iraqi leadership group that was willing to aid the US in governing Iraq in the short term. Garner claims that there is still time to “rectify” the mistakes made. Rumsfeld replies by saying, “Well, I don’t think there is anything we can do, because we are where we are… We’re not going to go back.” [Washington Post, 10/1/2006]

Late June 2003: Bremer Requests More Troops for Iraq
Paul Bremer asks the Pentagon to send about 50,000 more soldiers to Iraq, the equivalent of more than two divisions. The request is discussed at a National Security Council meeting but the White House is reluctant to satisfy the request. One source tells the Seattle Times that the “White House is aware that Bremer wants them. They’re not happy about it. They don’t want a formal request because then, politically, there’s fallout.” Rumsfeld denies that the Department of Defense has been asked to provide “anything that has not been supplied.” [Seattle Times, 7/2/2003]

Mid-2003: Guantanamo Detainee Made to Believe He Is in Egypt
At Guantanamo, detainee Mohamed al-Khatani is given a tranquilizer, fitted with blackened goggles, and put on a plane. He is told he is being sent to a Middle Eastern country. What happens next is probably equivalent to the technique authorized under the description “false flag” by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s April 16, 2003 memo on interrogation methods (see April 16, 2003). The plane returns to Guantanamo several hours later and he is taken to an isolation cell in the base’s brig where he is subjected to harsh interrogation procedures. He is led to believe that his interrogators are Egyptian national security operatives. In order to maintain the deception, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is not permitted to visit Khatani during this time. [New York Times, 1/1/2005]

July 9, 2003
Facing criticisms that the Bush administration lacked accurate and specific intelligence about Iraq’s alleged aresenal of illicit weapons, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld provides the Senate Armed Services Committee with a new reason for why it was necessary for the US to invade Iraq. “The coalition did not act in Iraq because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq’s pursuit of weapons of mass murder,” he says. “We acted because we saw the evidence in a dramatic new light, through the prism of our experience on 9/11.” [BBC, 7/9/2003; USA Today, 7/9/2003; Washington Times, 7/10/2003] When asked when he learned that the reports about Iraq attempting to obtain uranium from Niger were false, Rumsfeld replies, “Oh, within recent days, since the information started becoming available.” [Slate, 7/10/2003; WorldNetDaily, 7/15/2003] He later revises his statement twice, first saying that he had learned “weeks,” and then “months,” before. [WorldNetDaily, 7/15/2003]

July 29, 2003: David Kay Tells Top US Officials That Iraq Survey Group Has Yet to Find Evidence of WMD; Bush Unfazed
In a briefing to the president and other top officials, Kay says that he has found no evidence of weapons of mass destruction, and says the disputed trailers (see April 19, 2003 and May 9, 2003) were probably not mobile biological factories, as the CIA and White House had claimed (see May 28, 2003 and 2:28 p.m. May 29, 2003). Present at the briefing are Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, George Tenet, Condoleezza Rice, Andrew Card, and other White House aides. Kay’s briefing provokes little response from his audience. Describing the president’s reaction, Kay later says: “I’m not sure I’ve spoken to anyone at that level who seemed less inquisitive. He was interested but not pressing any questions. .. I cannot stress too much that the president was the one in the room who was the least unhappy and the least disappointed about the lack of WMDs. I came out of the Oval Office uncertain as to how to read the president. Here was an individual who was oblivious to the problems created by the failure to find WMDs. Or was this an individual who was completely at peace with himself on the decision to go to war, who didn’t question that, and who was totally focused on the here and now of what was to come?” [Isikoff and Corn, 2006, pp. 310]

August 9, 2003
Newsday reports that according to a senior official and another source within the Bush administration, the “ultimate objective” of Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith and “a group of neo-conservative civilians inside the Pentagon is change of government in Iran.” The report says that the “immediate objective appeared to be to ‘antagonize Iran so that they get frustrated and then by their reactions harden US policy against them.’” It apparently is no secret within the administration, as Secretary of State Colin Powell has recently complained directly to the Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, about Feith’s activities. [Newsday, 8/9/2003]

August 18, 2003
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld directs his undersecretary of defense for intelligence, Stephen Cambone, to send Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller to Iraq to review the US military prison system in Iraq and make suggestions on how the prisons can be used to obtain “actionable intelligence” from detainees. Cambone passes the order on to his deputy Lt. Gen. William Boykin who meets with Miller to plan the trip. [Washington Post, 5/21/2004; Newsweek, 5/24/2004]

(Late August 2003 or September 2003): Operation Copper Green expanded to Abu Ghraib
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone decide that they will extend the scope of “Copper Green,” originally created for Afghanistan (see Late 2001-Early 2002), to Abu Ghraib. According to Seymour Hersh, “The male prisoners could [now] be treated roughly, and exposed to sexual humiliation.” A former intelligence official will tell Hersh: “They weren’t getting anything substantive from the detainees in Iraq. No names. Nothing that they could hang their hat on. Cambone says, I’ve got to crack this thing and I’m tired of working through the normal chain of command. I’ve got this apparatus set up—the black special access program—and I’m going in hot. So he pulls the switch, and the electricity begins flowing… . And it’s working. We’re getting a picture of the insurgency in Iraq and the intelligence is flowing into the white world. We’re getting good stuff. But we’ve got more targets [prisoners in Iraqi jails] than people who can handle them.” In addition to bringing SAP rules into the Iraqi prisons, Cambone decides that Army military intelligence officers working inside Iraqi prisons will be brought under the SAP’s auspices, and in fact allowed the use of more aggressive interrogation techniques. “So here are fundamentally good soldiers—military intelligence guys—being told that no rules apply,” Hersh’s source also says. [New Yorker, 5/24/2004; Guardian, 9/13/2004] Knowledge of aggressive interrogation techniques may also have slipped inside the walls of Abu Ghraib via Special Forces soldiers delivering and interrogating prisoners and private contractors who used to be members of Special Forces. Many of Special Forces soldiers have gained this knowledge inter alia because they have been taught how to resist these techniques if subjected to them. Such training is given to both British and US Special Forces. An anonymous former British officer later recognizes the techniques used at Abu Ghraib as the type of tactics used for these trainings. The characterizing feature of the techniques they are trained to withstand is sexual humiliation through nudity and degrading poses. During training sessions, female soldiers mocked naked detainees and forced cruel sexual jokes on them to “prolong the shock of capture,” according to the British officer. The techniques included hooding, sleep deprivation, time disorientation, and lack of warmth, food, and water. “[T]he whole experience is horrible,” according to the British ex-officer. “Two of my colleagues couldn’t cope with the training at the time. One walked out saying ‘I’ve had enough,’ and the other had a breakdown. It’s exceedingly disturbing.” [Guardian, 5/8/2004]

XXVII

 

[Gold9472]

Commentaries
Seymour Hersh
Rumsfeld’s decision embittered the American intelligence community, damaged the effectiveness of elite combat units, and hurt America’s prospects in the war on terror.” — May 15, 2004 [New Yorker, 5/24/2004]

September 2003
Army Col. Thomas Pappas tells Army Lt. Col. Steven Jordan, a soldier overseeing interrogations at Abu Ghraib, that the White House wants interrogators to “pull the intelligence out” of the detainees. Pappas tells him at least twice “that some of the [intelligence] reporting was getting read by (Secretary of Defense Donald) Rumsfeld, folks out at Langley, some very senior folks.” [USA Today, 6/17/2004]

September 10, 2003: Military Lawyers in Iraq Develop New Set of Interrogation Rules
A team of military lawyers in Iraq issues a memo detailing a new set of interrogation rules entitled, CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (ICRP). The team—headed by the highest legal expert within the US military apparatus in Iraq, Col. Marc Warren, the staff judge advocate for Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 7—includes Capt. Fitch, the command judge advocate with Col. Thomas M. Pappas’ 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, and Maj. Daniel Kazmier and Maj Franklin D. Raab, both from the CJTF-7 Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA). In crafting the memo, Fitch “copie” Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s April 16, 2003 memo (see April 16, 2003), intended for Guantanamo, “almost verbatim.” The draft is then sent to the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion for comment. The 519th adds techniques from its own August 27, 2003 memo (see August 27, 2003), including “the use of dogs, stress positions, sleep management, sensory deprivation,… yelling, loud music, and light control.” The techniques listed in the final version of the memo apply to all categories of detainees. [US Department of Defense, 8/23/2004 pdf file] Sleep management and sensory deprivation are also part of the Guantanamo set of interrogation techniques. The other more aggressive methods—the use of dogs, stress positions, and yelling, loud music, and light control—are extras.

September 14, 2003-September 17, 2003: Cheney Links Iraq to 9/11; Bush, Rumsfeld, and Rice All Disavow Cheney’s Claim
Vice President Cheney says on NBC’s “Meet the Press”, “I think it’s not surprising that people make [the] connection” between Iraq and 9/11. He adds, “If We’re successful in Iraq . . . then we will have struck a major blow right at the heart of The Base, if you will, the geographic base of the terrorists who had us under assault now for many years, but most especially on 9/11.” However, two days later, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld states that he hasn’t “seen any indication that would lead” him to believe there was an Iraq-9/11 link. [Associated Press, 9/16/2003] National Security Adviser Rice says the administration has never accused Hussein of directing the 9/11 attacks. [Reuters, 9/16/2003] The next day, Bush also disavows the Cheney statement, stating, “We’ve had no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with September the 11th . . . [but] there’s no question that Saddam Hussein has al-Qaeda ties.” [CBS News, 9/17/2003; Washington Post, 9/18/2003]

October 2003: OLC Issues Opinion on Status of Protected Persons In Iraq
White House Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales asks the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) to provide an opinion on protected persons in Iraq and more specifically on the status of the detained Hiwa Abdul Rahman Rashul, an Iraqi prisoner being held in Afghanistan. In a one-page memo, Jack L. Goldsmith, head of the OLC, rules that Rashul is a “protected person” with rights under the Fourth Geneva Convention and therefore has to be returned to Iraq. Goldsmith also decides that non-Iraqis, who came to Iraq after the invasion, do not qualify for protection under the Geneva Conventions. [Washington Post, 10/24/2004]

Late October 2003: Rumsfeld Agrees to Keep Detainee Hidden from Red Cross
The CIA complies with the Office of Legal Counsel’s (OLC) opinion that Hiwa Abdul Rahman Rashul should be returned to Iraq (see October 2003). But CIA Director George Tenet asks Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to see that Rashul is hidden from Red Cross survey teams and that he not be given a registration number. The secretary of defense complies with the request. On June 16, 2004, [Christian Science Monitor, 6/17/2004] Rumsfeld will admit that he ordered Rashul to be hidden from the Red Cross in order to prevent the detainee’s interrogation from being interrupted. [CBS News, 6/18/2004] For the next seven months, Rashul remains a so-called “ghost detainee” at the High Value Detention facility near the Baghdad airport at Camp Cropper. [US News and World Report, 6/21/2004]

November 2003
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, at the request of George J. Tenet, orders military officials in Iraq to keep a high-value detainee being held at Camp Cropper off the records. The order is passed down to Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then to Gen. John P. Abizaid, the commander of American forces in the Middle East, and finally to Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, the ground commander in Iraq. “At each stage, lawyers reviewed the request and their bosses approved it,” the New York Times will report. “This prisoner and other ‘ghost detainees’ were hidden largely to prevent the International Committee of the Red Cross from monitoring their treatment, and to avoid disclosing their location to an enemy,” the newspaper will report, citing top officials. The prisoner—in custody since July 2003—is suspected of being a senior officer of Ansar al-Islam, an Islamic group with ties to al-Qaeda. Shortly after being captured by US forces, he was deemed an “enemy combatant” and thus denied protection under the Geneva conventions. Up until this point, the prisoner has only been interrogated once. As a result of being kept off the books, the prison system looses track of the detainee who will spend the next seven months in custody. “Once he was placed in military custody, people lost track of him,” a senior intelligence official will tell the New York Times. “The normal review processes that would keep track of him didn’t.” [New York Times, 6/17/2004; Reuters, 6/17/2004; Fox News, 6/17/2004]

November 24, 2003
President Bush signs into law the defense authorization bill, which contains a controversial rider allowing the Pentagon to circumvent the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) and Endangered Species Act (ESA). The MMPA prohibits government and commercial interests from engaging in activities harmful to the declining populations of whales, dolphins and seals. The act, passed in 1972, has been credited with halting the decline of some of those populations. The bill also exempts the military from certain provisions of the ESA. [Washington Post, 11/16/2003; Christian Science Monitor, 11/24/2003] For example, the bill:

• Permits the secretary of defense to exempt any military activity from the MMPA, without regard to its impact on whales, seals and dolphins. The Navy claims the MMPA puts American lives at risk because it makes it more difficult for the Navy to detect enemy submarines. [Washington Post, 11/16/2003; Christian Science Monitor, 11/24/2003; Earth Island Institute, 11/6/2004]
• Loosens the MMPA definition of “harassment” of marine mammals, making it almost impossible to enforce the MMPA. [Christian Science Monitor, 11/24/2003; Earth Island Institute, 11/6/2004]
• Extends the Pentagon’s exemptions to scientists who conduct research sponsored by the Navy or other federal agencies. [Earth Island Institute, 11/6/2004]
• Eliminates language in the MMPA that prohibits the Navy from doing sonars, invasive research, bomb testing and other activities that threaten the habitat of whales, seals and dolphins. [Christian Science Monitor, 11/24/2003; Earth Island Institute, 11/6/2004]
• Exempts US military bases and lands from ESA habitat-protection provisions. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld says that the new exemption will “improve… military readiness” even though a General Accounting Office study found that “very few units reported being unable to achieve combat-ready status due to inadequate training areas.” [General Accounting Office, 6/2002 pdf file; Christian Science Monitor, 11/24/2003; Earth Island Institute, 11/6/2004] Encouraged by their success at weakening the MMPA and ESA, defense officials say that next year they will attempt to modify a court agreement the Pentagon accepted the month before requiring the Navy to limit where it can use its new low-frequency sonar system that has the ability to track quiet diesel submarines. Critics argue the sonar’s frequency is so loud that it could kill noise-sensitive whales and dolphins. [Washington Post, 11/16/2003] The military is also planning to seek exemptions to the Clean Air Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and the Superfund Act (see April 6, 2004). [Christian Science Monitor, 11/24/2003]

December 2003
American Enterprise Institute’s vice president, Danielle Pletka, says that guidelines set by Donald Rumsfeld in August restricting the Pentagon’s communications with Iranian reformers have hindered analysts’ efforts to collect important information. (see August 2003) “I think information is a commodity we trade in freely in the United States,” she says. “The idea that informational meetings with Iranians should be off-limits to members of our government that deal with nonproliferation and national security seems to me to be foolish in the extreme.” [New York Daily Sun, 12/2/2003]

Shortly after the 2004 election
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld meets with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and tells them that George Bush’s reelection demonstrates the American public’s approval of the administration’s neoconservative policies. He also makes it clear that the administration will keep US troops in Iraq and that there will be no second-guessing. [New Yorker, 1/24/2005 Sources: unnamed former high-level intelligence official interviewed by Seymour Hersh]

January 12, 2004
Human Rights Watch writes to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld “to express concern about incidents in which US forces stationed in Iraq detained innocent, close relatives of wanted suspects in order to compel the suspects to surrender, which amounts to hostage-taking, classified as a war crime under the Geneva Conventions.” [Human Rights Watch, 5/7/2004]

January 13, 2004: Report on Abu Ghraib Prison Photographs Sent to White House
The Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) agent who received the Abu Ghraib prison photographs from Spc. Joseph Darby (see January 13, 2004), calls his boss, a colonel, who takes them to Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez. [Signal Newspaper, 7/4/2004] Within three days, a report on the photos makes its way to Donald Rumsfeld, who informs President Bush. [New Yorker, 5/24/2004] Within the Pentagon, few people are informed—unusually few—according to Hersh, who will later write that knowledge of the abuses were “severely, and unusually restricted.” A former intelligence official will tell him: “I haven’t talked to anybody on the inside who knew; nowhere. It’s got them scratching their heads.” Rumsfeld and his civilian staff, Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez and Gen. John P. Abizaid, reportedly try to suppress the issue during the first months of the year. “They foresaw major diplomatic problems,” according to a Pentagon official. [New Yorker, 5/17/2004] According to one former intelligence official, the Defense Secretary’s attitude is: “We’ve got a glitch in the program. We’ll prosecute it.” The former official explains to Seymour Hersh, “The cover story was that some kids got out of control.” [New Yorker, 5/24/2004]

January 18, 2004
The Washington Times reports that an unpublished report by defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton concludes that China is expanding its military and is “building strategic relationships” along sea lanes from the Middle East to Southern China “in ways that suggest defensive and offensive positioning to protect China’s energy interests, but also to serve broad security objectives.” The paper, titled “Energy Futures in Asia,” was commissioned by Donald Rumsfeld. China intends to protect the sea lanes militarily, by strengthening its navy and developing undersea mines and a missile system. The report warns that these capabilities could be used “to deter the potential disruption of its energy supplies from potential threats, including the US Navy, especially in the case of a conflict with Taiwan.” Beijing is also developing strategic alliances with the states along the sea lanes in an effort to increase its influence in the region. [Washington Times, 1/18/2005]
Pakistan - Beijing is constructing a naval base at the Pakistani port of Gwadar and setting up electronic eavesdropping posts in the city which will monitor ship traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Sea. [Washington Times, 1/18/2005]
Bangladesh - China is developing closer ties to Bangladesh and building a container port facility at the city of Chittagong. [Washington Times, 1/18/2005]
Burma - China has established close relations with the military regime of Burma. It has provided Burma with “billions of dollars in military assistance to support a de facto military alliance,” is building naval bases there, and has already positioned electronic intelligence gathering facilities on islands in the Bay of Bengal and near the Strait of Malacca. Burma’s location is of strategic importance to Beijing because of its close proximity to the Strait of Malacca, through which 80 percent of China’s imported oil is shipped. [Washington Times, 1/18/2005]
Cambodia - In November 2003, China agreed to provide training and equipment to Cambodia’s military. China and Cambodia are engaged in a joint effort to build a railway from southern China to the sea. [Washington Times, 1/18/2005]
Thailand - China may fund a $20 billion canal that would cut across the Kra Isthmus and allow ships to bypass the Strait of Malacca. [Washington Times, 1/18/2005]

February 10, 2004
Human Rights Watch sends a letter to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld expressing concern about the treatment of detainees in Iraq. The organization asks that the administration make information on the detainees publicly available. [Human Rights Watch, 5/7/2004]

March 3, 2004: Maj. Gen. Taguba Brief Gen. McKiernan on the Findings of his Investigation
Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba out-briefs the findings of his investigation to Gen. David McKiernan. [Slate, 5/5/2004; New York Times, 5/10/2004]

End Part XXVIII

 

[Gold9472]

March 12, 2004: Maj. Gen. Taguba Presents Findings of his Investigation to Superior Commanders
Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba presents his report (see February 26, 2004) on prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib to his commanders. [Truthout (.org), 5/14/2004] The report is “very closely held” among the Army’s senior leadership and the report is only accessible to top officials on a secure computer network. Congress is not informed of the report or its findings. [Baltimore Sun, 5/6/2004] It is classified as “Secret / No Foreign Dissemination.” Neither the vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine Gen. Peter Pace, nor the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld will later say they know why the report was classified when asked at a Pentagon press briefing on May 4. Such a classification may be in violation of US law. Section 1.7 of Executive Order 12958 reads: “In no case shall information be classified in order to… conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error [or to] prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency….” [Secrecy News, 5/5/2004]

March 25, 2004: Pentagon Official: ‘9/11 Had Its Benefits’
An unnamed senior Pentagon official tells Washington Times reporter Rowan Scarborough, “I hate to say this and would never say this in public, but 9/11 had its benefits. We never would have gone into Afghanistan and started this war [on terror] without it. There just was not the national will.” [Scarborough, 2004, pp. iii] Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has repeatedly referred to the Sultan of Oman similarly telling him that 9/11 was a “blessing in disguise” (see February 14, 2003-June 4, 2004). As early as the evening of 9/11, President Bush had referred to the political situation due to the attacks as a “great opportunity” (see (Between 9:30 p.m. and 10:00 p.m.) September 11, 2001).

May 3, 2004: Rumsfeld Directs Naval Inspector General To See that His Orders Are Being Carried Out
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld directs Albert T. Church III, the Naval Inspector General, to conduct a review “to ensure that his… orders with respect to detainees at GTMO [Guantanamo] and Charleston [are] being carried out.” [US Department of Defense, 5/12/2004]

May 4, 2004: Rumsfeld Questions Reporter’s Use of Word Torture To Describe What Happened at Abu Ghraib
To a question regarding allegations of abuse at Guantanamo, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld answers: “That is a pattern and a practice of terrorists, to allege abuse.” When a reporter uses the word “torture” in relation to the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, he responds: “I’m not a lawyer. My impression is that what has been charged thus far is abuse, which I believe technically is different from torture.” He adds: “I don’t know if… it is correct to say…, that torture has taken place, or that there’s been a conviction for torture. And therefore I’m not going to address the torture word.” [US Department of Defense, 5/4/2004]

May 6-7, 2004: Navy Admiral Conducts Investigation at Guantanamo; Questions Detainees
Vice Adm. Albert T. Church III, the navy inspector general, visits Guantanamo Bay in order “to ensure that [Donald Rumsfeld’s] orders with respect to detainees at GTMO [Guantanamo] and Charleston were being carried out” (see May 3, 2004) He conducts over 100 interviews among Guantanamo prison staff and does 43 at random under oath testimonies. Questions asked include: “Have you seen any abuse, have you heard of any abuse, do you know anybody who has seen abuse, would you report abuse if you saw it, would you feel free to come forward if you see anything that doesn’t look right.” [US Department of Defense, 5/12/2004]

May 7, 2004: Rumsfeld says Abuse Scandal Has Stained US Reputation
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld appears before the Senate to express his dismay over the abuse. The incidents of abuse, Rumsfeld says, “sullied the reputation of our country. I was stunned. It was a body blow.” [MSNBC, 5/13/2004]

June 4, 2004: Rumsfeld Says US Lacked Intelligence to Stop 9/11
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld says the US would have stopped 9/11, but “We lacked the intelligence that might have prevented it.” He blames the lack of “a source inside the group of people that had planned and executed those attacks.… Had we had a source inside there, we undoubtedly would have been able to stop it. We did not.” [Newsday, 6/4/2004]

June 28, 2004: Supreme Court Declines to Rule on Basis of Technicality
In the case of Jose Padilla v. Donald Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court votes 5 to 4 in favor of the government, declining to rule on the basis of a technicality. The majority argues that his petition was incorrectly filed in New York rather than in South Carolina where he is currently held. While Padilla was held in New York in preparation for an appearance before a grand jury, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld designated him an enemy combatant. Padilla was thereupon transferred to military custody and sent to a naval brig in South Carolina to be detained indefinitely. His lawyer meanwhile, unaware of her client’s transfer, filed a habeas corpus petition in New York against Rumsfeld. This was wrong say five justices who rule that Padilla has to re-file his petition in South Carolina. [Supreme Court opinion on writ of certiorari. Shafiq Rasul, et al. v. George W. Bush, et al., 6/28/2004] Four dissenting judges condemn the “secret transfer” of Padilla. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the minority of justices, declares, “At stake in this case is nothing less than the essence of a free society.” Stevens also condemns the use of “incommunicado detention for months on end” as a means “to extract information” and places it among the “tools of tyrants.” [Supreme Court opinion on writ of certiorari. Shafiq Rasul, et al. v. George W. Bush, et al., 6/28/2004]

July 2004: Rumsfeld Interferes With Investigations of Prisoner Abuse
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld reportedly pressures the Army to conclude the investigations (see August 25, 2004) of Generals George Fay and Anthony R. Jones by late August, before the Republican Convention in New York. [Guardian, 9/13/2004 Sources: Scott Horton]

July 26, 2004: Former Guantanamo Detainees Release Statement Describing Experience in US Custody
Former detainees Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal, and Rhuhel Ahmed release a “composite statement” describing in detail their experiences as detainees in Afghanistan and Guantanamo. [Rasul, Iqbal, and Ahmed, 7/26/2004 pdf file] Mark Jacobson, a former Defense Department official who worked on detainee issues in the office of Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld as part of the Detainee Policy Group, will call the report “a wonderful piece of propaganda” that mixes some truth with lies and misinterpretations. [Boston Globe, 8/5/2004]

August 14, 2004: Evidence Mounts Afghan Drug Profits Help Fund Al-Qaeda, but US Troops Do Nothing
The Independent reports that “there is mounting evidence that [Afghanistan’s] booming opium trade is funding terrorists linked to al-Qaeda.” The governor of Kandahar, in a joint press conference with a US general, states, “One of the most important things prolonging terrorism is drugs. We are 100 percent sure that some of the top terrorists are involved in drug smuggling, and eradication of this industry would not only benefit Afghanistan but would be a step towards eradicating terrorism [worldwide].” The Independent comments, “Patrolling US troops routinely turn a blind eye to opium farming and trading, ignoring poppy fields, and have recruited warlords suspected of being drug dealers to fight al-Qaeda.” Troops are explicitly told not to engage in drug eradication (see November 2003). It is believed that the US and allied military forces are overstretched in Afghanistan, and would face a violent backlash if they took more steps to confront drug trafficking. The Independent notes, “The drugs business is widely believed to have corrupted officials up to cabinet level, and many Afghans fear that they may have exchanged Taliban fundamentalism for rule by narco-mafias in the future.” Defense Secretary Rumsfeld has raised the possibility of using the 17,000 US soldiers still stationed in Afghanistan to take a more active role against the drug trade. [Independent, 8/14/2004] However, nine months later, no such change of policy will be evident. It will be reported that US and Afghan officials decided in late 2004 that a more aggressive anti-poppy effort is “too risky.” [New York Times, 5/22/2005]

Fall 2004
At the request of Donald Rumsfeld, President George Bush issues an Executive Order on the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) authorizing the military “to find and finish” terrorist targets, including certain al-Qaeda network members, al-Qaeda senior leadership, and other high-value targets. The order was cleared by the national-security bureaucracy. [New Yorker, 1/24/2005 Sources: unnamed pentagon consultant]

October 1, 2004: Senator Leahy Condemns Torture and Prisoner Abuses
Senator Patrick Leahy, the ranking Democrat on the Judiciary Committee, releases a statement condemning the allegations of the abuse and torture of Iraqi and Afghan detainees; the statement coincides with a letter Leahy sends to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. [Pyes, 9/20/2004] In the statement, Leahy says that committee chairman John Warner’s efforts to investigate the scandals "remain…hampered by the leadership of his own party and an Administration that does not want the full truth revealed." He continues, "Despite calls from a small handful of us who want to find the truth, Congress and this Administration have failed to seriously investigate acts that bring dishonor upon our great Nation and endanger our soldiers overseas."Leahy says, "The Bush Administration circled the wagons long ago and has continually maintained that the abuses were the work of ‘a few bad apples.’ I have long said that somewhere in the upper reaches of the executive branch a process was set in motion that rolled forward until it produced this scandal. Even without a truly independent investigation, we now know that the responsibility for abuse runs high up into the chain of command." He accuses the Senate Judiciary Committee, and the Senate as a whole, of falling "short in its oversight responsibilities.…Allowing senior officials to avoid accountability sets a dangerous precedent. It is time for Congress, even this Republican Congress, to do its job and take action. We must send a message that no one in the chain of command—from an enlisted private at Abu Ghraib to the Commander-in-Chief—is above the laws of our Nation." He calls for a truly independent investigation into the torture allegations, along the lines of the 9/11 Commission. He also calls for the US to once again begin following the guidelines of the Geneva Conventions. [US Senate, 10/1/2004]

October 20, 2004-November 3, 2004: BBC Documentary Argues That Many Aspects of ‘War on Terrorism’ Are Exaggerated Myths
The BBC airs a three-part documentary entitled The Power of Nightmares: The Rise of the Politics of Fear. It is directed by Adam Curtis, who the Guardian calls “perhaps the most acclaimed maker of serious television programs in Britain.” The documentary argues that much of what we have been told about the threat of international terrorism “is a fantasy that has been exaggerated and distorted by politicians. It is a dark illusion that has spread unquestioned through governments around the world, the security services, and the international media.” The documentary begins by focusing on Sayyid Qutb in Egypt and Leo Strauss in the US. Both developed theories in the 1950’s and 1960’s that liberalism and individualism was weakening the moral certainties of their societies. Qutb has a strong influence on Islamic Jihad leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, and then through him, Osama bin Laden. Strauss meanwhile has a strong effect on neoconservatives such as Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, and Paul Wolfowitz, who all eventually gain prominent positions in George W. Bush’s administration. The documentary follows the rise of Islamic radicals and compares and contrasts this with the rise of the neoconservatives. Curtis argues that both groups have greatly benefited from 9/11, because both have been able to use fear of terrorism to gain widespread popular support. Curtis claims that al-Qaeda is not the highly centralized, widespread, and powerful organization that it is frequently depicted to be. Rather, it is more of a concept and loose alliance of groups with coinciding interests. He says, “Almost no one questions this myth about al-Qaeda because so many people have got an interest in keeping it alive.” The documentary gains favorable reviews in newspapers such as the Los Angeles Times, Christian Science Monitor, and the Guardian. [Christian Science Monitor, 10/18/2004; BBC 2, 10/20/2004; BBC 2, 10/27/2004; BBC 2, 11/3/2004; BBC 2, 11/3/2004; Los Angeles Times, 1/11/2005]

End Part XXIX

 

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October 25, 2004
Vice President Dick Cheney says during a “town hall meeting” at Minnesota State University: “They’re already sitting on an awful lot of oil and gas. Nobody can figure why they need nuclear as well to generate energy.” [White House, 10/5/2004] The Washington Post later notes that “Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and outgoing Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz held key national security posts when the Ford administration made the opposite argument 30 years ago.” (see 1976) [Washington Post, 3/27/2005]

November 2004: Aggressive Afghan Counter-Narcotics Program Proposed and Ultimately Rejected
Assistant Secretary of State Bobby Charles, who runs the State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), has been growing increasingly concerned about the worsening drug crisis in Afghanistan. He starts warning his superiors that unless the problem is dealt with, it could “devour” the Afghan government. Charles pushes for a multi-faceted counter-narcotics program. One controversial aspect of his program would involve aggressive aerial spraying of Afghan poppy fields using a diluted solution of the pesticide known commercially as Roundup. To minimize Afghan opposition to the spraying, the program would be combined with an informational campaign asserting that the pesticide is safe and an aid package for alternative agricultural development. Further, the US military would begin counter-narcotics missions such as destroying drug labs. Secretary of State Colin Powell presents Charles’ program to President Bush and other top officials shortly after Bush’s reelection. Bush completely agrees with the program, even saying that he is determined not to “waste another American life on a narco-state.” However, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld is firmly opposed to the program and, as author James Risen notes, “Time and again in the Bush administration, Rumsfeld simply ignored decisions made by the president in front of his war cabinet, according to several senior administration officials.” One month later, with Powell losing power as he leaves the Bush administration, Rumsfeld decreases support for the program, effectively killing it. Charles is told that he is now “highly inconvenient” and is pushed out of his job by the new Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in early 2005. [Risen, 2006, pp. 152-162]

November 30, 2004: Civil Rights Groups File Criminal Complaints Against US Officials and Military Officers
The Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), based in New York, and the Republican Lawyers’ Association in Berlin, file a criminal complaint in Germany against Donald Rumsfeld, George Tenet, Stephen A. Cambone, Ricardo S. Sanchez, and Janis Karpinski, alleging responsibility for war crimes at Abu Ghraib. The German 2002 Code of Crimes Against International Law grants German courts universal jurisdiction in cases involving war crimes or crimes against humanity. The center is representing five Iraqis who claim they were victims of mistreatment that included beatings, sleep and food deprivation, electric shocks, and sexual abuse. [Deutsche Welle (Bonn), 11/30/2004] Though German law stipulates that prosecution can be dismissed in cases where neither the victim nor the perpetrator are German citizens or are outside Germany and cannot be expected to appear before court, [Deutsche Welle (Bonn), 11/30/2004] that fact that Sanchez is based at a US base in Germany makes it possible that the case will be heard. [Deutsche Welle (Bonn), 11/30/2004]

December 2004
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visits Kabul, Afghanistan. During his visit Afghan President Hamid Karzai consents to Washington’s decision to establish nine more permanent military bases in the country. The bases, to be manned by 2,200 troops, will be constructed in Helmand, Herat, Nimrouz, Balkh, Khost and Paktia. In the provinces of Khost and Paktia, there will be two bases. [News Insight, 3/5/2005] Observers note that Afghan President Hamid Karzai had little choice in the matter given that his government’s continuing existence is dependent upon the private security forces provided by the US. [Asia Times, 3/30/2005]

December 24, 2004: Rumsfeld Comment that Flight 93 Was ‘Shot Down’ Raises Eyebrows
In a speech given on this day, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld describes terrorists as “the people who attacked the United States in New York, shot down the plane over Pennsylvania and attacked the Pentagon…” His comment that Flight 93 was “shot down” draws attention. A few days later, CNN reports, “A Pentagon spokesman insisted that Rumsfeld simply misspoke, but Internet conspiracy theorists seized on the reference to the plane having been shot down.” [CNN, 12/24/2004; CNN, 12/27/2004]

(Early January 2005)
Investigative reporter Seymour Hersh interviews a government consultant with close ties to the Pentagon about the administration’s plans to invade Iran. He says that Pentagon officials, including Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, believe that a limited attack on Iran would inspire a secular revolution in the country. “The minute the aura of invincibility which the mullahs enjoy is shattered, and with it the ability to hoodwink the West, the Iranian regime will collapse,” the consultant says. [CNN, 1/17/2005; New Yorker, 1/24/2005]

March 1, 2005: ACLU Suit Rumsfeld on Behalf of Eight Detainees Who Claim To Have Been Tortured
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Human Rights First file a lawsuit against Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in the northern district of Illinois, his home state. They do so on behalf of eight men formerly detained in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay who claim to have been tortured. “Rumsfeld bears direct responsibility,” for the former prisoners’ treatment, says ACLU Executive Director Anthony Romero. [CBS News, 3/1/2005] ACLU’s Lucas Guttentag, lead counsel in the lawsuit, says, “Secretary Rumsfeld bears direct and ultimate responsibility for this descent into horror by personally authorizing unlawful interrogation techniques and by abdicating his legal duty to stop torture.” The parties seek a court order declaring that Rumsfeld violated the US Constitution, federal statutes, and international law, and compensatory damages for the inflicted harm that the eight men suffered due to torture, abuse, and degrading treatment. The civil rights groups are joined as co-counsel by a number of prominent legal experts, among them former Judge Advocate General of the Navy, retired Rear Admiral John D. Hutson; former Chief Judge of the US Army Court of Criminal Appeals, retired Brig. Gen. James Cullen; and former Assistant Attorney General Bill Lann Lee. [Human Rights First, 3/1/2005]

March 22, 2005
While in Argentina, Donald Rumsfeld gives a speech praising foreign participation in the UN mission to Haiti. Rumsfeld says that Argentina in particular is “playing a truly vital role in the multinational peacekeeping forces in Haiti.” In response to Donald Rumsfeld’s speech, sociologist Emilio Taddei denounces the UN intervention in Haiti saying that the US and France are pressuring Latin American armies to intervene. Taddei adds that “humanitarian missions are the new disguise for the old colonial invasions that served to legitimise a coup d’etat.” [Inter Press Service, 3/22/2005]

May 15, 2005
The Washington Post reports that during the summer of 2004, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld approved a top secret Interim Global Strike Alert Order (see July 2004), code-named CONPLAN 8022, “directing the military to assume and maintain readiness to attack hostile countries that are developing weapons of mass destruction, specifically Iran and North Korea.” [Tribune (Chandigarh), 9/8/2004; Washington Post, 5/15/2005]

June 1, 2005
US Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld warns governments in Middle East not to help Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, recently reported to have been seriously injured in Iraq. “Were a neighboring country to take him in and provide medical assistance or haven for him, they, obviously, would be associating themselves with a major linkage in the al-Qaeda network and a person who has a great deal of blood on his hands.” [US Department of Defense, 6/1/2005] Zarqawi is rumored to have fled to Iran for treatment (see May 29, 2005).

June 26, 2005: Rumsfeld Unsure If US Is Eliminating More Terrorists than Creating Them
Asked on NBC’s Meet the Press if the US is “capturing, killing, or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day” than are being created, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld replies, “Tough to know. I don’t know the answer to the question.” [Meet the Press, 6/26/2005]

Morning-Afternoon, August 27, 2005: Louisiana National Guard Activates, Pre-Positions
The Louisiana National Guard is alerted this morning, according to Lt. Col. Pete Schneider: “[A]ll of a sudden, on Saturday morning, the call went out, you know, this thing is in the Gulf. The call still went out to, ‘Hey, we got to keep an eye on it a little bit more now,’ but it was still projected to go into the eastern Panhandle. You know, everybody was keeping an eye on it, but—and then Friday—and then Saturday afternoon was, ‘That’s it, you know, it’s not making the turn. It’s time to roll.’” [National Public Radio, 9/9/2005 Sources: Pete Schneider] Approximately 3,500-4,000 National Guard members called to state active duty, along with along with Guard equipment such as vehicles, generators, and Humvees. According to Schneider, troops fan out to staging areas across the state, where they will wait for the storm to pass, before distributing supplies and maintaining order. The emergency plan anticipates the possibility of looting and violence. The plans call for Guard troops to be pre-positioned with the New Orleans Police Department and with state police troops throughout the greater New Orleans area. [Salon, 9/1/2005; National Public Radio, 9/9/2005 Sources: Pete Schneider] As of today, approximately 35 percent of Louisiana’s National Guard troops are serving in Iraq or Afghanistan, according to the National Guard. Approximately 40 percent of Mississippi’s National Guard Troops and approximately 23 percent of Alabama’s National Guard troops are also serving overseas. [American Forces Press Service, 8/29/2005] Louisiana’s 256th Infantry and Mississippi’s 155th Armored, each deployed overseas, contain hundreds of members who serve in “combat support” roles such as engineers, truck drivers, and logisticians, and thus who specialize in the disaster relief functions. [Los Angeles Times, 9/11/2005] Lt. Gen. Steven Blum, head of the National Guard, will later claim that the deployment of Guard troops and equipment oversees has left troops at home without the equipment and vehicles necessary to respond to a crisis such as Katrina. Most of the Guard’s satellite phones, which are essential during power and cell phone service outages that will occur when Katrina sweeps through, are overseas, according to Blum, as is most of the Guard’s best equipment. Sen. John Warner (R-Va.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, will state that “once again our Guard is, I don’t like to use the word ‘stressed,’ but they are challenged” by commitments at home and overseas. [Chicago Tribune, 9/17/2005] However, top Pentagon officials will deny that the Guard’s deployment in Iraq has any impact on the Guard’s ability to respond to the disaster. “That’s just flat wrong. Anyone who’s saying that doesn’t understand the situation,” Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld will contend. [Los Angeles Times, 9/11/2005]

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Note - The exact number of members called to active duty today is unclear. Several news reports indicate that 3,500 members are called to duty. [MacCash and O.Byrne, 8/29/2005; American Forces Press Service, 8/29/2005; Salon, 9/1/2005] . Other news reports state that 4,000 members are called to duty. [National Public Radio, 9/9/2005] The Boston Globe will report that 5,700 Guard members are deployed by Monday. The Baton Rouge Advocate reports that it based on a timeline received from the Louisiana National Guard, 2,000 members are mobilized on Saturday, and 4,000 members are mobilized by Sunday. [Advocate (Baton Rouge), 9/9/2005]

September 21, 2005: Senate Judiciary Committee Holds Public Hearing on Able Danger Unit; Key Officers Barred From Testifying
The Senate Judiciary Committee, led by Sen. Arlen Specter (R), holds a public hearing to investigate an intelligence program called Able Danger, to explore allegations that it identified Mohamed Atta and three other hijackers more than a year before 9/11, and to learn why the Pentagon disbanded it and destroyed the information it had gathered. [Government Computer News, 9/21/2005; New York Times, 9/21/2005; United Press International, 9/21/2005] The committee is seeking testimony from several former Able Danger members. Among these are Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, Navy Capt. Scott Phillpott, Dr. Eileen Preisser, and civilian analyst James D. Smith; all but Preisser have recently come forward with allegations about the unit (see August 17, 2005; August 22-September 1, 2005). However, the day before the hearing, Defense Department lawyers ordered them and other former Able Danger members not to testify. [Jerry Doyle Show, 9/20/2005; United Press International, 9/21/2005] Shaffer says in an interview, “I was told by two [Defense Department] officials today directly that it is their understanding that [Defense Secretary Rumsfeld] directed that we not testify…” [Jerry Doyle Show, 9/20/2005] The Defense Department’s only reason for doing so, offered by a spokesman, is that they have “expressed [their] security concerns and believe it is simply not possible to discuss Able Danger in any great detail in an open public forum open testimony of these witnesses.” [New York Times, 9/21/2005] Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter says, “That looks to me like it may be obstruction of the committee’s activities, something we will have to determine.” He complains that the Pentagon only delivered hundreds of pages of documents related to Able Danger late on the eve of the hearing, leaving no time for committee staff to review the material. [Reuters, 9/21/2005] Furthermore, the Pentagon’s representative at the hearing, William Dugan, admits that he has very limited knowledge of Able Danger. Arlen Specter tells him, “You were sent over—perhaps with the calculation you wouldn’t have the information.” [Associated Press, 9/21/2005; Government Computer News, 9/21/2005]

October 2005: Former Powell Aide Calls for Legislation to Reform Inter-Agency and National Security Decision Making Processes; Strongly Criticizes Neocons in Bush Administration
What I saw was a cabal between the Vice President of the United States, Richard Cheney, and the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, on critical issues that made decisions that the bureaucracy did not know were being made. And then when the bureaucracy was presented with those decisions and carried them out, it was presented in such a disjointed incredible way that the bureaucracy often didn’t know what it was doing as it moved to carry them out.” Wilkerson contrasts the current president with his father, George H.W. Bush, “one of the finest presidents we have ever had,” who, in Wilkerson’s opinion, understood how to make foreign policy work. In contrast, George W. Bush is “not versed in international relations and not too much interested in them either. There’s a vast difference between the way George H. W. Bush dealt with major challenges, some of the greatest challenges at the end of the 20th century, and effected positive results in my view, and the way we conduct diplomacy today.” Wilkerson lays the blame for the Abu Ghraib detainee abuse directly at the feet of the younger Bush and his top officials, whom Wilkerson says gave tacit approval to soldiers to abuse detainees. As for Condoleezza Rice, then the national security adviser and now Powell’s successor at the State Department, she was and is “part of the problem.” Instead of ensuring that Bush received the best possible advice even if it was not what Bush wanted to hear, Rice “would side with the president to build her intimacy with the president.” Wilkerson also blames the fracturing and demoralization of the US military on Bush and his officials. Officers “start voting with their feet, as they did in Vietnam,” he says, “and all of a sudden your military begins to unravel.” [American Strategy Program, 10/19/2005; Financial Times, 10/20/2005] Wilkerson calls Bush’s brand of diplomacy “cowboyism,” and says that repairing the US’s tarnished image with the other world nations is an impossible task: “It’s hard to sell sh*t.” [Salon, 10/27/2005]

November 18, 2005: More Than Half of Congress Calls for Open Able Danger Hearings
Rep. Curt Weldon (R) sends Defense Secretary Rumsfeld a letter signed by 246 congresspeople demanding that Able Danger program officers and contractors be allowed to testify in open congressional hearings. There is a nearly even split between Democrat and Republican signatures. [Sacramento Bee, 11/24/2005]

Late 2005: Rumsfeld Cancels Mission to Capture Al-Zawahiri in Pakistan
US intelligence learns through communications intercepts about a meeting of al-Qaeda leaders in North Waziristan, in the remote border regions of Pakistan near Afghanistan. Intelligence officials have an “80 percent confidence” that al-Qaeda’s second in command Ayman al-Zawahiri and/or other top al-Qaeda leaders are attending the meeting. One intelligence official involved in the operation says, “This was the best intelligence picture we had ever seen” about a high-value target. [New York Times, 7/8/2007; Newsweek, 8/28/2007] The original plan calls for cargo planes to carry 30 Navy Seals near the target, then they will use motorized hang gliders to come closer and capture or kill al-Zawahiri. The plan is enthusiastically endorsed by CIA Director Porter Goss and Joint Special Operations Commander Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal. But Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and his assistant Stephen Cambone are uncertain. They increase the size of the force to 150 to take care of contingencies. [Newsweek, 8/28/2007] One senior intelligence official involved later says for effect, “The whole thing turned into the invasion of Pakistan.” Having decided to increase the force, Rumsfeld then decides he couldn’t carry out such a large mission without Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf’s permission. But with the cargo planes circling and the team waiting for a green light, Rumsfeld decides that Musharraf would not approve. He cancels the mission without actually asking Musharraf about it. It is unclear whether President Bush was informed about the mission. The New York Times will later report that “some top intelligence officials and members of the military’s secret Special Operations units” are frustrated at the decision to cancel the operation, saying the US “missed a significant opportunity to try to capture senior members of al-Qaeda.” [New York Times, 7/8/2007] It is not clear why the US does not hit the meeting with a missile fired from a Predator drone instead, as they will do to kill an al-Qaeda leader inside Pakistan a couple of months later (see May 8, 2005).

February 17, 2006: Rumsfeld Defends DoD Program that Plants Stories in Iraqi Newspapers
In a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld defends a Pentagon program that has been planting pro-US stories (see September 2004-September 2006) in the Iraqi press. “The US military command, working closely with the Iraqi government and the US embassy, has sought nontraditional means to provide accurate information to the Iraqi people in the face of aggressive campaign of disinformation. Yet this has been portrayed as inappropriate; for example, the allegations of someone in the military hiring a contractor, and the contractor allegedly paying someone to print a story—a true story—but paying to print a story. For example, the resulting explosion of critical press stories then causes everything, all activity, all initiative, to stop, just frozen. Even worse, it leads to a chilling effect for those who are asked to serve in the military public affairs field.” [Council of Foreign Relations, 2/17/2006]

June 8, 2006: Al-Zarqawi Reported Killed in Iraq; His Importance and Extent of Al-Qaeda Ties Remain in Dispute
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the supposed leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, is apparently killed in a US airstrike north of Baghdad. There are contradictory details of what exactly happened in the airstrike, and three days later the Washington Post will report that “circumstances surrounding the killing [remain] cloudy.” [Washington Post, 6/10/2006] His killing is hailed by US and Iraqi officials as the most significant public triumph for US-allied forces since the 2003 capture of Saddam Hussein. For instance, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld calls him “the leading terrorist in Iraq and one of three senior al-Qaeda leaders worldwide.” The Washington Post calls al-Zarqawi the “mastermind behind hundreds of bombings, kidnappings and beheadings in Iraq.” [Washington Post, 6/8/2006; Washington Post, 6/10/2006] These pronouncements and media reports ignore a revelation made two months earlier by the Washington Post that the US military has been engaged in a propaganda campaign to exaggerate al-Zarqawi’s importance. The newspaper had reported that Zarqawi wasn’t behind nearly as many attacks as commonly reported (see October 4, 2004 and April 10, 2006). Even a Washington Post article about the propaganda surrounding al-Zarqawi published two days after his death will fail to mention any of the details provided in the Post’s original reporting on the campaign. [Washington Post, 6/10/2006] Later in the month, an audiotape surfaces in which bin Laden supposedly praises al-Zarqawi as a martyr (see June 30, 2006), calling him a “brave knight” and a “lion of jihad.” US officials say the tape is genuine, however it should be noted that a letter from 2004 said to tie al-Zarqawi to al-Qaeda leadership is believed by many experts to be a US-government promoted hoax (see April 10, 2006). [Washington Post, 6/30/2006]

November 6-8, 2006: Defense Secretary Rumsfeld Resigns
Donald Rumsfeld resigns as US Defense Secretary. On November 6, he writes a letter telling President Bush of his resignation. Bush reads the letter the next day, which is also the date for midterm elections in the US, in which the Democratic Party wins majorities in the Senate and House of Representatives. Bush publicly announces the resignation the next day. No explanation is given. [Reuters, 8/15/2007] He is formally replaced by Robert Gates on December 18, 2006.

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