Who Is Major Kevin Nasypany?

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(8:38 a.m.-8:43 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NORAD Personnel Mistake Hijacking for Part of an Exercise
When Boston flight control first contacts NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) to notify it of the hijacking of Flight 11 (see (8:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001), personnel there initially mistake it for a simulation as part of an exercise. Lieutenant Colonel Dawne Deskins, mission crew chief for the Vigilant Guardian exercise currently taking place (see (6:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001), later says that initially she and everybody else at NEADS thought the call was part of Vigilant Guardian. [Newhouse News Service, 1/25/2002] Although most of the personnel on the NEADS operations floor have no idea what the day’s exercise is supposed to entail, most previous major NORAD exercises included a hijack scenario. [USA Today, 4/18/2004; Utica Observer-Dispatch, 8/5/2004] The day’s exercise is in fact scheduled to include a simulated hijacking later on. Major Kevin Nasypany, the NEADS mission crew commander, had helped design it. Thinking the reported hijacking is part of this exercise he actually says out loud, “The hijack’s not supposed to be for another hour.” In the ID section, at the back right corner of the NEADS operations floor, technicians Stacia Rountree, Shelley Watson, and Maureen Dooley, react to the news. Rountree asks, “Is that real-world?” Dooley confirms, “Real-world hijack.” Watson says, “Cool!” [Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006] NORAD commander Major General Larry Arnold, who is at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, also says that when he first hears of the hijacking, in the minutes after NEADS is alerted to it, “The first thing that went through my mind was, is this part of the exercise? Is this some kind of a screw-up?” [ABC News, 9/11/2002; 9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003] At 8:43 a.m., Major James Fox, the leader of the NEADS Weapons Team, comments, “I’ve never seen so much real-world stuff happen during an exercise.” [Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006]

8:40 a.m. September 11, 2001: NEADS Learns of Threat to Flight 11 Cockpit
The communications team at NEADS is trying to quickly find out all they can about the hijacked plane, such as its flight number, tail number, and where it is. ID tech Shelley Watson calls the management desk at Boston flight control, which had alerted NEADS to the hijacking minutes earlier. The man who answers tells her, “We don’t know where he’s goin’. He’s heading towards Kennedy [International Airport in New York City]. He’s… 35 miles north of Kennedy now at 367 knots. We have no idea where he’s goin’ or what his intentions are.” He adds, “I guess there’s been some threats in the cockpit.” Master Sergeant Maureen Dooley is standing over Watson, relaying any pertinent information she hears to Major Kevin Nasypany. She calls to him, “OK, he said threat to the cockpit!” [Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006]

(8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Fighters Ordered to Scramble to Flight 11 Nine Minutes after NORAD Notification
Two F-15 fighters are ordered to scramble from Otis Air National Guard Base in Massachusetts to find Flight 11, approximately 190 miles from the known location of the plane and 188 miles from New York City. [Channel 4 News (London), 9/13/2001; Washington Post, 9/15/2001; CNN, 9/17/2001; Los Angeles Times, 9/17/2001; North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/18/2001; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] On the NEADS operations floor Major Kevin Nasypany instructed Major James Fox, the leader of the Weapons Team, to launch the Otis fighters a minute earlier, at 8:45 a.m. [Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006] Interestingly, the 9/11 Commission will later state that “Because of a technical issue, there are no NEADS recordings available of the NEADS senior weapons director and weapons director technician position responsible for controlling the Otis scramble.” [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 459] According to the commission, NORAD makes the decision to scramble after only one phone call, as the decision is made to act first and get clearances later. Yet there is a nine-minute gap between when the 9/11 Commission says NORAD is notified about the hijacking at 8:37 a.m., and when the fighters are ordered scrambled. This delay has not been explained. The pilots had already received several unofficial warnings before this order—possibly as early as 8:34 a.m., 12 minutes earlier. One of the pilots recalls sitting in the cockpit, ready and waiting for the scramble order to come. [BBC, 9/1/2002; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] According to some reports, the Otis fighters only take off six minutes after the scramble order, at 8:52 a.m. [North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/18/2001; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] The fighters’ initial target, Flight 11, is already crashing into the WTC at this time. NEADS Commander Robert Marr later claims, “My intent was to scramble Otis to military airspace while we found out what was going on.” [Filson, 2004, pp. 56]

8:52 a.m. September 11, 2001: Fighters Ordered Toward the Crashed Flight 11
Two F-15s take off from Otis Air National Guard Base. This occurs six minutes after being ordered to go after Flight 11(which has already crashed); 26 minutes after flight controllers were certain Flight 11 was hijacked; and 39 minutes after flight controllers lost contact with Flight 11. [Washington Post, 9/12/2001; Washington Post, 9/15/2001; CNN, 9/17/2001; North American Aerospace Defense Command, 9/18/2001; ABC News, 9/11/2002; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] According to the Cape Cod Times, as soon as the pilots strap in, the green light to launch goes on, and they’re up in the air even before their fighters’ radar kicks in. [Cape Cod Times, 8/21/2002] In Rome, NY, NEADS has just received news of the plane hitting the WTC (see (8:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Major Kevin Nasypany, the facility’s mission crew commander, is asked what to do with the Otis fighters. He responds, “Send ‘em to New York City still. Continue! Go! This is what I got. Possible news that a 737 just hit the World Trade Center. This is a real-world.… Continue taking the fighters down to the New York City area, JFK area, if you can. Make sure that the FAA clears it—your route all the way through.… Let’s press with this.” [Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006] Yet there are conflicting reports of the fighters’ destination (see 8:52 a.m. (and After) September 11, 2001), with some accounts saying they are directed toward military-controlled airspace off the Long Island coast. NEADS Commander Robert Marr says, “My intent was to scramble Otis to military airspace while we found out what was going on.” [Filson, 2004, pp. 56-59; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]

End Part I