March 1999
US intelligence learns of plans by an al-Qaeda member who is also a US citizen, to fly a hang glider into the Egyptian Presidential Palace and then detonate the explosives he is carrying. The individual, who received hang glider training in the US, brings a hang glider back to Afghanistan, but various problems arise during the testing of the glider. This unnamed person is subsequently arrested and is in custody abroad. [Senate Intelligence Committee 9/18/02]

Spring 1999
US intelligence learns of a planned bin Laden attack on a US government facility in Washington (which facility has not been made public). [Senate Intelligence Committee 9/18/02; New York Times 9/18/02]

June 1999 (B)
In testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and in a briefing to House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence staffers one month later, the chief of the CTC describes reports that bin Laden and his associates are planning attacks in the US. [Senate Intelligence Committee 9/18/02]

July 14, 1999
US government informant Randy Glass records a conversation at a dinner attended by him, illegal arms dealers Diaa Mohsen and Mohammed Malik (see June 12, 2001), a former Egyptian judge named Shireen Shawky, and ISI agent Rajaa Gulum Abbas, held at a restaurant within view of the WTC. FBI agents pretending to be restaurant customers sit at nearby tables. [WPBF Channel 25, 8/5/02, MSNBC, 8/2/02] Abbas says he wants to buy a whole shipload of weapons stolen from the US military to give to bin Laden. [Cox News 8/2/02] Abbas points to the WTC and says, “Those towers are coming down.” This ISI agent later makes two other references to an attack on the WTC. [WPBF Channel 25, 8/5/02, Cox News, 8/2/02, Palm Beach Post, 10/17/02] Abbas also says, “Americans [are] the enemy,” and, “We would have no problem with blowing up this entire restaurant because it is full of Americans.” [MSNBC, 3/18/03] The meeting is secretly recorded, and parts are shown on television in 2003 (see also August 17, 1999). [MSNBC 3/18/03 (B)]

September 1999 (D)
US intelligence obtains information that bin Laden and others are planning a terrorist act in the US, possibly against specific landmarks in California and New York City. The reliability of the source is unknown. [Senate Intelligence Committee 9/18/02]

September 1999 (E)
Agents from Oklahoma City FBI office visit the Airman Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma to investigate Ihab Ali, who has already been identified as bin Laden's former personal pilot. Ali attended the school in 1993 and is later named as an unindicted coconspirator in the 1998 US Embassy bombing in Kenya. [CNN 10/16/01; Boston Globe 9/18/01; Senate Intelligence Committee 10/17/02] When Ali was arrested in May 1999, he was working as a taxi driver in Orlando, Florida. Investigators discover recent ties between him and high ranking al-Qaeda leaders, and suspect he was a “sleeper” agent. [St. Petersburg Times 10/28/01] However, the agent visiting the school is not given most background details about him. [Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03 (B)] It's not known if these investigators are aware of a terrorist flight school warning given by the Oklahoma City FBI office in 1998 (see May 18, 1998). Hijackers Atta and Marwan Alshehhi later visit the Airman school in July 2000 but ultimately decide to train in Florida instead. [Boston Globe, 9/18/01] Al-Qaeda agent Zacarias Moussaoui takes flight lessons at Airman in 2001 (see February 23, 2001). One of the FBI agents sent to visit the school at this time visits it again in August 2001 asking about Moussaoui, but he fails to make a connection between the two visits (see August 23, 2001 (E)).

September 1999 (C)
A report prepared for US intelligence entitled the “Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism” is completed. It states: “Al-Qaeda's expected retaliation for the US cruise missile attack … could take several forms of terrorist attack in the nation's capital. Al-Qaeda could detonate a Chechen-type building-buster bomb at a federal building. Suicide bomber(s) belonging to al-Qaeda's Martyrdom Battalion could crash-land an aircraft packed with high explosives (C-4 and Semtex) into the Pentagon, the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or the White House. Whatever form an attack may take, bin Laden will most likely retaliate in a spectacular way.” The report is by the National Intelligence Council, which advises the President and US intelligence on emerging threats. [AP 4/18/02; complete report on-line] The Bush administration later claims to have never heard of this report until May 2002, despite the fact that it had been publicly posted on the internet since 1999, and “widely shared within the government” according to the New York Times. [CNN 5/18/02; New York Times 5/18/02]

September 15, 1999
The first phase of the US Commission on National Security/21st Century, co-chaired by former Senators Gary Hart (D) and Warren Rudman (R) is issued. It concludes: “America will be attacked by terrorists using weapons of mass destruction and Americans will lose their lives on American soil, possibly in large numbers” (see also January 31, 2001). [USCNS Reports]

October 5, 1999
The highly respected Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor reports that US intelligence is worried bin Laden is planning a major terrorist attack on US soil. They are said to be particularly concerned about some kind of attack on New York, and they have recommended stepped-up security at the New York Stock Exchange and the Federal Reserve. [NewsMax 10/5/99]

Early December 1999
The CIA learns from the Jordanian government about an al-Qaeda millennium bombing plot (see November 30, 1999). Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke is told of this, and he implements a plan to neutralize the threat. [Against All Enemies, by Richard Clarke, 3/04, p. 205, p. 211] The plan, approved by President Clinton, focuses on harassing and disrupting al-Qaeda members throughout the world. The FBI is put on heightened alert, counterterrorism teams are dispatched overseas, a formal ultimatum is given to the Taliban to keep al-Qaeda under control, and friendly intelligence agencies are asked to help. There are Cabinet-level meetings nearly every day dealing with terrorism. [Washington Post, 4/20/00, AP, 6/28/02] All US embassies, military bases, police departments, and other agencies are given a warning to be look out for signs of an al-Qaeda millennium attack. One alert border agent responds by arresting terrorist Ahmed Ressam, which leads to the unraveling of several bombing plots (see December 14, 1999 and December 14-31, 1999). No terror attacks occur (see December 31, 1999-January 1, 2000). However, Clarke claims the FBI generally remains unhelpful. For example, around this time the FBI says there are no web sites in the US soliciting volunteers for training in Afghanistan or money for terrorist front groups. Clarke has a private citizen check to see if this is true, and within days he is given a long list of such web sites. The FBI and Justice Department apparently fail to do anything with the information. [Newsweek 3/31/04 (B)]

December 14, 1999
Al-Qaeda terrorist Ahmed Ressam is arrested in Port Angeles, Washington, attempting to enter the US with components of explosive devices. 130 pounds of bomb-making chemicals and detonator components are found inside his rental car. He subsequently admits he planned to bomb Los Angeles International Airport on December 31, 1999. [New York Times, 12/30/01] Alert border patrol agent Diana Dean stops him; she and other agents nationwide had been warned recently to look for suspicious activity (see Early December 1999). Ressam's bombing would have been part of a wave of attacks against US targets over the New Year's weekend (see ). He is later connected to al-Qaeda and convicted, but he still hasn't been formally sentenced. [Senate Intelligence Committee 9/18/02; PBS Frontline 10/3/02]

December 31, 1999-January 1, 2000
The CIA expects five to 15 attacks against American targets around the world over the New Year's weekend, but none occur. [Time 8/4/02] A heightened state of alert helps stop some attacks (see November 30, 1999, Early December 1999, December 14, 1999, and December 14-31, 1999), while an attack on a naval ship in Yemen fails through sheer luck (see January 3, 2000).

December 31, 1999-January 1, 2000
Earlier in December, the CIA estimates that al-Qaeda will launch between five to 15 attacks against American targets around the world over the New Year's weekend. “Because the US is [bin Laden]'s ultimate goal…we must assume that several of these targets will be in the US… ” [Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03 (B), Time, 8/4/02] Since late 1999, there is intelligence that targets in Washington and New York would be attacked at this time. [Senate Intelligence Committee 9/18/02] There in fact are a number of planned attacks, including bomb attacks on the Boston and Los Angeles airports, a hotel in Jordan, and a naval ship in Yemen. (see November 30, 1999, December 14, 1999, and January 3, 2000). But all of the attacks are foiled, thanks to a good deal of luck. [Washington Post 1/20/02]

2000-September 11, 2001
In a roughly two year period before the 9/11 attacks, NORAD conducts regional war game exercises simulating hijacked airliners used as weapons to crash into targets and cause mass casualties. One of the imagined targets is the World Trade Center. In another exercise, jets perform a mock shoot-down over the Atlantic Ocean of a jet laden with chemical poisons headed toward the US. A third exercise has the Pentagon as the target, but apparently that drill is not run after officials say it is too unrealistic (see April 2001). NORAD confirms that “Numerous types of civilian and military aircraft were used as mock hijacked aircraft” in these drills. [USA Today, 4/18/04] At some undetermined point before 9/11, a regional exercise simulated the crash of a foreign airplane flying into the US and crashing into a famous US building. The building is not known, but it is said not to be either the WTC or the Pentagon. This exercise “involved some flying of military aircraft as well as a command post exercise in which communications procedures were practiced in an office environment.” NORAD has stated that prior to 9/11, it “normally conducted four major exercises a year, most of which included a hijack scenario.” [CNN 4/19/04]

End Part IV