The Response to the 9/11 Hijackings
With this background understanding of the numerous warnings given and a complete lack of protective measures taken, we can now turn to the subject of the May 2003 Independent Commission hearings. How effective were the air defenses on 9/11? Not surprisingly, with only 14 fighters on 24-hour active alert, the military was already at an unnecessary disadvantage. But even factoring in such a lack of planes, the defensive response to the hijackings was so remarkably poor that it has caused some to wonder if the hijackers were deliberately allowed to succeed.

Before looking at how the military response to 9/11 fared, we should consider the defensive posture on the East Coast at the time. Officially, there were only two air force bases in the Northeast region that were formally part of NORAD's defensive system. One was Otis Air National Guard Base on Massachusetts' Cape Cod peninsula and about 188 miles east of New York City. The other was Langley Air Force Base near Norfolk, Virginia, and about 129 miles south of Washington. [BBC, 8/29/02] During the Cold War, the US had literally thousands of fighters on alert. But as the Cold War wound down, this number was reduced until it reached only 14 fighters in the continental US by 9/11. [Los Angeles Times, 9/15/01 (B)] A cursory web search shows that until recently, many units were on five-minute alert status, which meant that from the moment they were scrambled (ordered into the air), they were guaranteed to be airborne within five minutes. NORAD has claimed that on 9/11 fighters in bases within its system, including Otis and Langley, were guaranteed to get airborne within 15 minutes, not five. [Calgary Herald, 10/13/01, NORAD Testimony, 5/23/03] (Why this reduction in capability happened even as the terrorist threat dramatically increased is another unanswered question.)

These planes within NORAD's system routinely scrambled after other aircraft. Often the goal was drug interdiction. General Ralph Eberhart, NORAD Commander in Chief, said that before 9/11, "Normally, our units [flew] 4-6 sorties a month in support of the NORAD air defense mission." [Federal News Service, 10/25/01] In 2000, there were 425 "unknowns"—pilots who didn't file or diverted from flight plans or used the wrong frequency. Fighters were scrambled in response to 129 of those cases, when problems were not immediately resolved. [Calgary Herald, 10/13/01] Unfortunately, statistics on how many minutes it took for these fighters to get airborne apparently have not been released.

But there are dozens of other air force bases on the East Coast. How quickly other bases could get fighters into the air varied from base to base. Before 9/11, the web sites of many of these bases used terms like "combat ready,""five minute alert,""highest state of readiness," and so on, indicating they should have been able to quickly respond as well. For instance, the web site for Andrews Air Force Base next to Washington boasted that it hosted two "combat ready" squadrons, "capable and ready response forces for the District of Columbia in the event of a natural disaster or civil emergency." The District of Columbia Air National Guard was stationed at Andrews, and its web site claimed its mission was "to provide combat units in the highest possible state of readiness." Both web sites changed on September 12, 2001, and the phrases suggesting such quick response capability were removed. [DC Military website, DCANG Home Page (before and after the change)] Bases at Westfield, Massachusetts; Syracuse, New York; and Hartford, Connecticut, also promised high readiness status, and these bases would have been in good positions to defend the skies on 9/11.

The Morning of September 11, 2001
As the sun rose on September 11, 2001, NORAD was already taking part in the Vigilant Guardian war game, which had begun a few days before. [Newhouse News, 1/25/02, Ottawa Citizen, 9/11/02, Code One Magazine, 1/02] As a result, NORAD was in peak form. It was fully staffed and alert, and senior officers were manning stations throughout the US when the first hijacking was reported. [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02] Because of the war game, NORAD "had extra fighter planes on alert." [ABC News, 9/14/02] Colonel Robert Marr, in charge of NORAD's Northeastern US sector, said, "We had the fighters with a little more gas on board. A few more weapons on board." [ABC News, 9/11/02]

American Airlines Flight 11
All four of the hijacked planes were scheduled to take off within several minutes of 8:00 a.m., though Flight 93 was delayed on the runway for 40 minutes. Flight 11 from Boston was the first plane to get hijacked. Edited transcripts of the cockpit transmissions show that the last routine communication between Flight 11 and Boston's air traffic control was at 8:13 a.m. and 47 seconds. [New York Times, 10/16/01 (C)] The loss of communication was quickly noticed—flight controllers can be heard discussing it at 8:15. Furthermore, "just moments" after the radio contact was lost, the transponder was turned off as well. [MSNBC, 9/15/01] The transponder is the electronic device that identifies the jet on the controller's screen, gives its exact location and altitude, and also allows a four-digit emergency hijack code to be sent. Boston air traffic manager Glenn Michael later said, "We considered [Flight 11] at that time to be a possible hijacking." [AP, 8/12/02]

Normally, pilots press the ELT (emergency locator transmitter) button as soon as they suspect a hijacking is in progress. This button is within easy reach. However, the pilot of Flight 11, Captain John Ogonowski, did not press this button, and nor did the pilots on Flights 77 and 93. There has been speculation that this may have been because hijackers were already in the cockpits when the hijackings began, posing as a guest pilot sitting in the cockpit's extra seat. [Fox News, 9/24/01, Boston Globe, 11/23/01] This would explain, for instance, why Flight 11's radio contact and transponder signal were both lost at about 8:14, while two stewardesses calling from the flight indicated the hijackers in the passenger section didn't get out of their seats until about 8:21. [Boston Globe, 11/23/01, ABC News, 7/18/02] But Captain Ogonowski was clever. He began turning the talk-back button off and on, which enabled flight controllers to hear what was being said, and also showed them that something was wrong. One controller said, "The button was being pushed intermittently most of the way to New York," and continued until about 8:38, so he must have started not long after 8:14. [Christian Science Monitor, 9/13/01, MSNBC, 9/15/01]

Flight controllers suspected something was wrong, but perhaps were confused because the ELT button had not been activated. But at 8:20, Flight 11 stopped transmitting its IFF (identify friend or foe) beacon signal [CNN, 9/17/01], and the plane also was clearly off course by that time (see adjacent flight path map). As a result, at "about 8:20" Boston flight control decided that Flight 11 had probably been hijacked. [Newsday, 9/23/01, New York Times, 9/15/01 (C)] However, it did not notify NORAD or anyone else of a possible problem.

This is when the failure of America's air defense system began. FAA regulations in force at the time state, "Consider that an aircraft emergency exists... when: ... There is unexpected loss of radar contact and radio communications with any... aircraft." [FAA regulations] They also state, "If... you are in doubt that a situation constitutes an emergency or potential emergency, handle it as though it were an emergency." [FAA regulations] Furthermore, MSNBC explained that a significant course deviation is "considered a real emergency, like a police car screeching down a highway at 100 miles an hour" and leads to fighters being quickly dispatched to see what the problem might be. [MSNBC, 9/12/01] But, as ABC News later put it, around 8:20, "There doesn't seem to have been alarm bells going off, traffic controllers getting on with law enforcement or the military. There's a gap there that will have to be investigated." [ABC News, 9/14/01]

If there still was any doubt Flight 11 had been hijacked, that doubt was removed at 8:24. Because Captain Ogonowski was periodically holding down the talk-back button, beginning at 8:24 and 38 seconds, Boston flight controllers heard the hijackers in the cockpit broadcasting a message to the passengers: "We have some planes. Just stay quiet and you will be OK. We are returning to the airport." A flight controller responded, "Who's trying to call me?" The hijacker continued, "Everything will be OK. If you try to make any moves you'll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet." [Guardian, 10/17/01, New York Times, 10/16/01 (C)] A Boston flight controller later said that immediately after hearing this voice, he "knew right then that he was working a hijack." [Village Voice, 9/13/01] At 8:25 exactly, seconds after hearing this message, Boston flight control notified other flight control centers of the hijacking. But, supposedly, once again it did not notify NORAD. Incredibly, NORAD asserts that it wasn't told of the hijacking until 8:40 - a full 15 minutes later! [NORAD, 9/18/01]

These 15 minutes are vital. As mentioned previously, NORAD guaranteed that its fighters could take off within 15 minutes of being given the order to scramble. It must also have taken a few minutes for NORAD to confirm the situation and pass the word to the pilots. Let's say this takes five minutes (in actual fact, when Major General Larry Arnold at NORAD's Command Center in Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, first heard that Flight 11 had been hijacked, he said, "Go ahead and scramble them, and we'll get the authorities later" [ABC News, 9/11/02], so pilot notification could have happened very quickly). It would then have taken another 15 minutes at most to get the fighters in the air. A NORAD spokeswoman said that fighters from Otis can reach New York City in 10 to 12 minutes. [Cape Cod Times, 9/16/01] So, adding this up, 8:25, plus 5, 15, and 12 minutes, means that the fighters would have reached New York City by 8:57. This would have been too late for Flight 11, which crashed into the World Trade Center at 8:46, but it would have reached New York six minutes before Flight 175, which crashed at 9:03.

Lies and Contradictions
Thus, had the FAA not delayed its notification of NORAD, the approximately 620 people killed in the World Trade Center's South Tower might have been saved. [New York Magazine, 9/02] Had the FAA reported its suspicions at 8:20 or even around 8:14 (when a hijacking was already suspected), the fighters would have had another 15 to 21 minutes to reach New York City and decide what to do. But is it true that the FAA did in fact wait so long before notifying NORAD? As a matter of fact, a later ABC News report says that the FAA notified NORAD employee Lt. Colonel Dawne Deskins at 8:31 a.m., not 8:40. [ABC News, 9/11/02] A different version of that ABC report states, "Shortly after 8:30 a.m., behind the scenes, word of a possible hijacking reached various stations of NORAD." [ABC News, 9/14/02] Even such a late notification around 8:30 would have given the fighters from Otis a fighting chance to reach Flight 175 before it crashed, especially since NORAD says the fighters only took six minutes to get ready and take off, instead of the maximum 15. [NORAD, 9/18/01]

NORAD claims that after being told of the hijacking at 8:40, it waited six minutes to give the scramble order to the Otis pilots. It then took another six minutes before the pilots took off. So, at 8:52, two fighters took off toward New York City. According to Lt. Col. Timothy Duffy, one of the pilots, before he took off a fellow officer had told him, "This looks like the real thing." Duffy later said, "It just seemed wrong. I just wanted to get there. I was in full-blower all the way." A NORAD commander has said the planes were stocked with extra fuel as well. [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/02] Full-blower meant the fighters were going as fast as they could go. An F-15 can travel over 1875 mph. [Air Force News, 7/30/97] Duffy later said, "As we're climbing out, we go supersonic on the way, which is kind of nonstandard for us." Their target destination was the airspace over Kennedy airport in New York City. [ABC News, 9/11/02]

So even if the late notification of 8:40 is true, these fighters still should have been able to reach New York City before Flight 175 as long as they traveled 1100 mph or faster—far below their maximum speed of 1875 mph. In fact, Major General Larry Arnold says they did head straight for New York City at about 1100 to 1200 mph. [MSNBC, 9/23/01 (C), Slate, 1/16/02] Yet, according to NORAD, the journey took 19 minutes, meaning the fighters traveled below 600 mph, and below supersonic speeds. [NORAD, 9/18/01] Major Gen. Paul Weaver, director of the Air National Guard, thus made the absurd statement, "The pilots flew 'like a scalded ape,' topping 500 mph but were unable to catch up to the airliner." [Dallas Morning News, 9/16/01] At that speed, Flight 11 would have been traveling faster than the fighters!

End Part IV