Commander Said To Be Open To More Troops

Commander Said to Be Open to More Troops

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/24/wo...gewanted=print

By MICHAEL R. GORDON and DAVID E. SANGER

WASHINGTON, Dec. 23 — The American military command in Iraq is now willing to back a temporary increase in American troops in Baghdad as part of a broader Iraqi and United States effort to stem the slide toward chaos, senior American officials said Saturday.

President Bush and his advisers were told Saturday of the new position when Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates met with them at Camp David, an administration official said.

Until recently, the top ground commander in Iraq, Gen. George W. Casey Jr., has argued that sending more American forces into Baghdad and Anbar Province, the two most violent regions of Iraq, would increase the Iraqi dependency on Washington, and in the words of one senior official, “make this feel more like an occupation.”

But General Casey and Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, who has day-to-day command of American forces in Iraq, indicated they were open to a troop increase when Mr. Gates met with them in Baghdad this week.

“They are open to the possibility of some increase in force,” a senior Defense Department official said. “They are supportive of taking steps to support the Iraqis in their plan, including the possible modest augmentation in U.S. combat forces.”

“Nobody has decided anything yet and they have not made a formal recommendation,” the official continued. “They are open to the idea of such an option and are weighing how best to execute it and what the traffic will bear with the Iraqis.”

The possible increase in troops, officials said, ranges from fewer than 10,000 to as many as 30,000.

Politically, winning the support of American generals for the additional troops is crucial to Mr. Bush if he hopes to make the increase part of the new strategy he is expected to announce in early January.

Over the past two weeks, Mr. Bush has appeared at odds with the generals in some of his comments, as the White House veered toward strategies that involve a greater show of force and some members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff questioned whether a “surge” in forces would make a lasting difference.

The Camp David meeting convened by President Bush included Mr. Gates, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the national security adviser, Stephen J. Hadley, for what the White House called a chance for Mr. Gates, who took office this week, to report on his findings. Mr. Bush plans to convene a full meeting of the National Security Council on Thursday at his ranch in Crawford, Tex.

The key to any new strategy, some officials said, would be a binding commitment by the Iraqi government that it would provide far more troops as well, and take other steps to try to slow the sectarian violence. The government of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki has repeatedly stressed the desire to take charge of the security situation in Baghdad, but failed to send most of the reinforcements the Americans requested this summer during a beefed-up effort to quell the violence.

It is unclear how Mr. Bush plans to enforce any commitments from Mr. Maliki, but Mr. Gates said in Baghdad before flying home that he sensed “a broad strategic agreement between the Iraqi military and Iraqi government and our military.”

“There is still some work to be done,” he said. “But I do expect to give a report to the president on what I’ve learned and my perceptions.” Mr. Gates was joined on his Iraq tour by officials from the White House and other parts of the government.

Administration officials, who spoke anonymously because they were not authorized to publicly discuss internal deliberations, said that General Casey had not yet submitted a formal recommendation to Mr. Gates and Mr. Bush. Mr. Gates, they said, asked General Casey to enter into final discussions with Iraqi officials on the specifics of their role.

But officials said General Casey was coming closer to the position of General Odierno that a greater a show of force would be critical to the effort to contain the Sunni insurgency and tamp down the violence by Shiite militias. The shift in the general’s position was first reported in The Los Angeles Times on Saturday.

General Casey has long argued that the principal emphasis of American policy should be on training Iraqi security forces, and handing over responsibility to the Iraqi military and police. In a plan General Casey presented in Washington in June, he anticipated reducing some American combat troops in September. But his plan was shelved after the surge in violence in Iraq.

As the sectarian killings escalated, the White House began to explore the option of sending more troops as a broader strategy to secure Baghdad. The idea was raised in a November memo prepared by Mr. Hadley. Mr. Bush discussed the option during a recent meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that was organized as part of the administration’s Iraq strategy review.

Some generals appeared notably unenthusiastic. Some members of the Joint Chiefs appeared worried about the strain it would place on the Army and the Marines. Gen. John P. Abizaid, the top American commander for the Middle East, told Congress last month that adding 20,000 troops would improve security, but argued that the effect would only be temporary because the United States military was not large enough to sustain such an increase indefinitely.

As for General Casey, he suggested Wednesday that he was neither the originator of the idea nor actively lobbying for it. At the same time, he indicated that he was not adamantly opposed to it. “Additional troops have to be for a purpose,” the general said. “I’m not necessarily opposed to the idea, but what I want to see happen is, if we do bring more American troops here, they help us progress toward our strategic objectives.”

Should Mr. Bush decide to send more troops, General Casey’s backing for a such a step would help the president deal with Congressional critics, who have pressed the administration to begin a withdrawal. It would also aid him with Republicans, some of whom were taken aback this week when Colin L. Powell, the former secretary of state who also served as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Mr. Bush had not yet clearly defined a role for additional troops that made it worth the projected casualties and deeper American involvement.

Mr. Gates said during the trip that he did not believe that Iraqi leaders were deeply split on the question of an increase in the American presence. Mr. Maliki proposed a plan to Mr. Bush in their meeting last month in Amman, Jordan, under which the Iraqis would assume direct command of its 10 Army divisions and a National Police division by June.

The Iraqi prime minister also proposed that his government assume the primary responsibility for security in Baghdad over the next several months while most American forces would move to the periphery of the city. The idea of moving American troops to the capital’s outskirts is consistent with General Casey’s long-term plan, but the Iraqi time frame is far more compressed. Some of Mr. Bush’s aides have expressed concern that the Iraqis’ desire for control outstrips their capacity.

However, as a political matter, officials said, it is crucial that Mr. Bush be able to announce that any increase in American troops will be made in parallel with a similar commitment by the Iraqis, and that the eventual goal of the strategy is to put the Iraqis in the lead. The Iraqis promised to send two brigades of Iraqi Army troops this summer, but most of the troops never arrived.

Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey, who oversees the training of Iraq’s security forces, said this week that he was overhauling his training efforts so that Iraqi Army units would be easier to deploy, including providing more pay.

“We’ve got two or three brigade headquarters and six additional battalions that are scheduled now over the next couple of months to come to Baghdad,” he said. An Iraqi battalion nominally has more than 700 soldiers, but the actual number is often far less, since many soldiers are on scheduled leaves or absent without leave.