Gold9472
09-21-2008, 03:20 PM
United 93, 9/11 Commission – Additions To The 9/11 Timeline As Of September 21, 2008
Kevin Fenton
9/21/2008
About half of this week's new entries concern United Airlines Flight 93. The airline's operations centre sent a message to the plane's co-pilot some minutes before the hijacking, but received no reply (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a910acarstohomer&scale=0#a910acarstohomer); it also notified flights of a crash at the WTC around 9:03 but did not send a warning (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a903dispatchersnotify&scale=0#a903dispatchersnotify) about possible hijackings at this time. The airline's dispatchers were asked to warn flights (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a921ualissuesorder&scale=0#a921ualissuesorder) at 9:21, the same time Flight 93 sent a routine message (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a921routinemessage&scale=0#a921routinemessage) to one of the dispatchers. A couple of minutes later, it checked in (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a924flight93checksin&scale=0#a924flight93checksin) with Cleveland air traffic control; the pilots then sent their last last message (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a927lastcontact&scale=0#a927lastcontact) at 9:27.
Learning of potential problems on board, United tried to contact (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a931ualtries&scale=0#a931ualtries) the plane at 9:31, and then sent a message to all flights, including flight 93, telling them to secure their cockpits (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a932securecockpit&scale=0#a932securecockpit). Dispatchers learned flight 93 was heading towards Washington (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a936flight93heading&scale=0#a936flight93heading) at 9:36 and offered assistance, and a dispatcher issued another warning about securing the cockpit (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a940moreacars&scale=0#a940moreacars) at 9:40. United's attempt to implement the lockout procedure for flight 93 failed (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a950lockoutfails&scale=0#a950lockoutfails) at about 9:50, at the same time a dispatcher told Flight 93 to land at the nearest airport and was informed the flight may have been hijacked (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a950landasap&scale=0#a950landasap).
A few minutes after it crashed, a message was sent to the plane telling it not to divert to Washington (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a1010dontdivert&scale=0#a1010dontdivert), and none of the passengers relatives went to the airport it was scheduled to arrive at in San Francisco to meet the passengers (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a215norelatives&scale=0#a215norelatives). In 2007, a German television program was denied permission (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a091107renz&scale=0#a091107renz) to film the wreckage.
Regarding the other flights, American Airlines ordered all its flights to land immediately (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a915americanorders&scale=0#a915americanorders) at 9:15, and a dispatcher notified United flights of a ground stop (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a908ballingergroundstop&scale=0#a908ballingergroundstop) in New York at 9:08. United ordered no new take offs for any international flights (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a920ualnotakeoffs&scale=0#a920ualnotakeoffs) around 9:20, and a dispatcher sent a warning to Flight 175 at 9:23 (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a923ballingerwarns175&scale=0#a923ballingerwarns175), several minutes after it hit the WTC.
There are also a number of entries regarding the 9/11 Commission. Most importantly, as the commission was just beginning its work in early 2003, Executive Director Philip Zelikow had already completed an outline of its final report (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a0303outline&scale=0#a0303outline). Also early on in the inquiry, the commission decided it would not bother with subpoenas (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a012703commissionsubpoena&scale=0#a012703commissionsubpoena), which left Commissioner Max Cleland disappointed (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=aafter012703clelanddisappointed&scale=0#aafter012703clelanddisappointed). Later on, CIA Director George Tenet heard a false rumor the commission was to call for his firing, and got White House Chief of Staff Andy Card (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=aearly04tenetresign&scale=0#aearly04tenetresign) to plead with the commissioners for his job.
Meanwhile, Zelikow awarded the contract to distribute the commission's final report to his own publisher, which could keep the profits (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=abefore0604zelikownorton&scale=0#abefore0604zelikownorton), and had passages about Saudi government support for the hijackers deleted (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a0604snelldeletes&scale=0#a0604snelldeletes) from the final report. Passages critical of National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice were also deleted, with the help of a top Democratic staffer (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a0604mayclarke&scale=0#a0604mayclarke). Just before the report was completed, a consultant to the commission complained it was "indulgent" (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=abefore0604mayindulgent&scale=0#abefore0604mayindulgent) of senior officials, and a staff member cornered Commissioner Jamie Gorelick in the ladies room (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a0704fbiwhitewash&scale=0#a0704fbiwhitewash) to complain about the report's lenient treatment of the FBI. Finally, the final report was savaged (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a1204falkenrathessay&scale=0#a1204falkenrathessay) in a joint Harvard/MIT journal.
Miscellaneous entries cover a private pilot who penetrated Soviet air defenses (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a052887rust&scale=0#a052887rust) in the late 1980s, and the poor security (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a021504nuclearsecurity&scale=0#a021504nuclearsecurity) at US nuclear facilities (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a021504levernierfatal&scale=0#a021504levernierfatal). Finally, a Nepalese man arrested at Chicago airport had the same address as another suspected terrorist, but the FBI denied any connection (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a110301subashgurung&scale=0#a110301subashgurung), an al-Qaeda-assisted plot to bomb a UN building in Somalia failed (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=abefore100393somaliabomb&scale=0#abefore100393somaliabomb) in 1993, and mystery firefighters were seen behaving oddly (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a1100oddfirefighters&scale=0#a1100oddfirefighters) inside the Pentagon on the day of 9/11.
Originally posted here (http://www.historycommons.org/news.jsp?oid=140393703-693). If you can spare a dollar or two, please remember the History Commons is in need of donations (http://www.historycommons.org/donate.jsp).
Kevin Fenton
9/21/2008
About half of this week's new entries concern United Airlines Flight 93. The airline's operations centre sent a message to the plane's co-pilot some minutes before the hijacking, but received no reply (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a910acarstohomer&scale=0#a910acarstohomer); it also notified flights of a crash at the WTC around 9:03 but did not send a warning (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a903dispatchersnotify&scale=0#a903dispatchersnotify) about possible hijackings at this time. The airline's dispatchers were asked to warn flights (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a921ualissuesorder&scale=0#a921ualissuesorder) at 9:21, the same time Flight 93 sent a routine message (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a921routinemessage&scale=0#a921routinemessage) to one of the dispatchers. A couple of minutes later, it checked in (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a924flight93checksin&scale=0#a924flight93checksin) with Cleveland air traffic control; the pilots then sent their last last message (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a927lastcontact&scale=0#a927lastcontact) at 9:27.
Learning of potential problems on board, United tried to contact (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a931ualtries&scale=0#a931ualtries) the plane at 9:31, and then sent a message to all flights, including flight 93, telling them to secure their cockpits (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a932securecockpit&scale=0#a932securecockpit). Dispatchers learned flight 93 was heading towards Washington (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a936flight93heading&scale=0#a936flight93heading) at 9:36 and offered assistance, and a dispatcher issued another warning about securing the cockpit (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a940moreacars&scale=0#a940moreacars) at 9:40. United's attempt to implement the lockout procedure for flight 93 failed (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a950lockoutfails&scale=0#a950lockoutfails) at about 9:50, at the same time a dispatcher told Flight 93 to land at the nearest airport and was informed the flight may have been hijacked (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a950landasap&scale=0#a950landasap).
A few minutes after it crashed, a message was sent to the plane telling it not to divert to Washington (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a1010dontdivert&scale=0#a1010dontdivert), and none of the passengers relatives went to the airport it was scheduled to arrive at in San Francisco to meet the passengers (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a215norelatives&scale=0#a215norelatives). In 2007, a German television program was denied permission (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a091107renz&scale=0#a091107renz) to film the wreckage.
Regarding the other flights, American Airlines ordered all its flights to land immediately (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a915americanorders&scale=0#a915americanorders) at 9:15, and a dispatcher notified United flights of a ground stop (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a908ballingergroundstop&scale=0#a908ballingergroundstop) in New York at 9:08. United ordered no new take offs for any international flights (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a920ualnotakeoffs&scale=0#a920ualnotakeoffs) around 9:20, and a dispatcher sent a warning to Flight 175 at 9:23 (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a923ballingerwarns175&scale=0#a923ballingerwarns175), several minutes after it hit the WTC.
There are also a number of entries regarding the 9/11 Commission. Most importantly, as the commission was just beginning its work in early 2003, Executive Director Philip Zelikow had already completed an outline of its final report (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a0303outline&scale=0#a0303outline). Also early on in the inquiry, the commission decided it would not bother with subpoenas (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a012703commissionsubpoena&scale=0#a012703commissionsubpoena), which left Commissioner Max Cleland disappointed (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=aafter012703clelanddisappointed&scale=0#aafter012703clelanddisappointed). Later on, CIA Director George Tenet heard a false rumor the commission was to call for his firing, and got White House Chief of Staff Andy Card (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=aearly04tenetresign&scale=0#aearly04tenetresign) to plead with the commissioners for his job.
Meanwhile, Zelikow awarded the contract to distribute the commission's final report to his own publisher, which could keep the profits (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=abefore0604zelikownorton&scale=0#abefore0604zelikownorton), and had passages about Saudi government support for the hijackers deleted (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a0604snelldeletes&scale=0#a0604snelldeletes) from the final report. Passages critical of National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice were also deleted, with the help of a top Democratic staffer (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a0604mayclarke&scale=0#a0604mayclarke). Just before the report was completed, a consultant to the commission complained it was "indulgent" (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=abefore0604mayindulgent&scale=0#abefore0604mayindulgent) of senior officials, and a staff member cornered Commissioner Jamie Gorelick in the ladies room (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a0704fbiwhitewash&scale=0#a0704fbiwhitewash) to complain about the report's lenient treatment of the FBI. Finally, the final report was savaged (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a1204falkenrathessay&scale=0#a1204falkenrathessay) in a joint Harvard/MIT journal.
Miscellaneous entries cover a private pilot who penetrated Soviet air defenses (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a052887rust&scale=0#a052887rust) in the late 1980s, and the poor security (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a021504nuclearsecurity&scale=0#a021504nuclearsecurity) at US nuclear facilities (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a021504levernierfatal&scale=0#a021504levernierfatal). Finally, a Nepalese man arrested at Chicago airport had the same address as another suspected terrorist, but the FBI denied any connection (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a110301subashgurung&scale=0#a110301subashgurung), an al-Qaeda-assisted plot to bomb a UN building in Somalia failed (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=abefore100393somaliabomb&scale=0#abefore100393somaliabomb) in 1993, and mystery firefighters were seen behaving oddly (http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a1100oddfirefighters&scale=0#a1100oddfirefighters) inside the Pentagon on the day of 9/11.
Originally posted here (http://www.historycommons.org/news.jsp?oid=140393703-693). If you can spare a dollar or two, please remember the History Commons is in need of donations (http://www.historycommons.org/donate.jsp).