Kevin Fenton
03-11-2008, 10:49 AM
I have written a summary of the 9/11 Timeline's CIA Hiding Alhazmi and Almihdhar chapter. It begins:
Parts of the story of the CIA’s knowledge of the 9/11 hijackers have trickled out over the years since the attacks, contained in three reports, of the Congressional Inquiry, 9/11 Commission and Justice Department, as well as in books, in particular the Looming Tower by Lawrence Wright, and evidence presented at the trial of Zacarias Moussoaui. When all the information is put together, two conclusions stand out: everything that could have gone wrong did go wrong, and almost every time something went wrong, the same man was at the centre of the failure: Tom Wilshire, deputy chief of Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, and later CIA liaison to the FBI.
A meeting in Malaysia
How the CIA came to know of two of the 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, is tied up with a meeting of al-Qaeda leaders in Malaysia. The NSA learned of the meeting (http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a122999hijackercalls&scale=0#a122999hijackercalls) through a wiretap on Almihdhar’s phone, which had been in place for over a year (http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a0898captured&scale=0#a0898captured) at this point (http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=aearly99nsamonitors&scale=0#aearly99nsamonitors), and informed the CIA (http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a1299safehouse&scale=0#a1299safehouse). The CIA tracked Almihdhar to the meeting and made a copy of his passport (http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a010500tomeeting&scale=0#a010500tomeeting) during a stopover in Dubai. The passport indicated Almihdhar had a US visa, and checks indicated it was genuine and had not yet been used. A similar operation to obtain Alhazmi’s passport details (http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a010200nawaflost&scale=0#a010200nawaflost) on the way to the meeting failed. The two future hijackers were then monitored (http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a010500summitfilmed&scale=0#a010500summitfilmed) at the meeting (http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a010500malaysiameeting&scale=0#a010500malaysiameeting).
Continued here:
http://www.iraqtimeline.com/blog/?p=44
Parts of the story of the CIA’s knowledge of the 9/11 hijackers have trickled out over the years since the attacks, contained in three reports, of the Congressional Inquiry, 9/11 Commission and Justice Department, as well as in books, in particular the Looming Tower by Lawrence Wright, and evidence presented at the trial of Zacarias Moussoaui. When all the information is put together, two conclusions stand out: everything that could have gone wrong did go wrong, and almost every time something went wrong, the same man was at the centre of the failure: Tom Wilshire, deputy chief of Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, and later CIA liaison to the FBI.
A meeting in Malaysia
How the CIA came to know of two of the 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, is tied up with a meeting of al-Qaeda leaders in Malaysia. The NSA learned of the meeting (http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a122999hijackercalls&scale=0#a122999hijackercalls) through a wiretap on Almihdhar’s phone, which had been in place for over a year (http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a0898captured&scale=0#a0898captured) at this point (http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=aearly99nsamonitors&scale=0#aearly99nsamonitors), and informed the CIA (http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a1299safehouse&scale=0#a1299safehouse). The CIA tracked Almihdhar to the meeting and made a copy of his passport (http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a010500tomeeting&scale=0#a010500tomeeting) during a stopover in Dubai. The passport indicated Almihdhar had a US visa, and checks indicated it was genuine and had not yet been used. A similar operation to obtain Alhazmi’s passport details (http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a010200nawaflost&scale=0#a010200nawaflost) on the way to the meeting failed. The two future hijackers were then monitored (http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a010500summitfilmed&scale=0#a010500summitfilmed) at the meeting (http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a010500malaysiameeting&scale=0#a010500malaysiameeting).
Continued here:
http://www.iraqtimeline.com/blog/?p=44